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 Introduction 
The Latin proverb ​ubi bene ​(where life is good), ​ibi patria ​(there is the homeland)               
foreshadows this research’s findings on identities displaced from the homeland. The word of             
homeland was coined in the 1660s, coming from the old English ​hamland ​meaning an “enclosed               
pasture,” “a situation of a person’s life in a contained space that progresses to various forms of                 
growth which elevate humanity.” In an enclosed space, one has no choice but to discover whom                1
one is within a certain land. The land, or this enclosed space, will then be defined as what one’s                   
life consists of. Having one’s identity formulate on this ground, or ‘enclosed space,’ or              
simultaneously develop within a land that could become the home of this newly formed identity,               
makes the identity a function of the homeland itself. This importance of the homeland, apart               
from being an essential constructive part of one’s identity, is often taken for granted as if it were                  
solely the place where one is not only born, but receives one’s subsequent nationality as well.                
The term identity itself seems too polysemic and not descriptive enough with regard to the               
diverse subjects it is supposed to cover. Identification, in fact, resonates with the construction of               
a relationship that is always in progress, involving an individual and his or her surroundings.               
Groups, norms, territories, and cultural attributes partake in the abstract poles of belonging to a               
family, culture, or a nation. In a certain sense, identifications are byproducts of socializations. In               
another, despite the importance of these determinations, displacements, and social          
incorporations, an individual should have the freedom to choose and alter his or her identity               
based on the groups in which one feels not only accepted but also essentially welcomed. This                
choice would have a legitimate social weight with its own validation, instated by interactions              
1 ​Etymonline.com Homeland​ accessed April 28th, 2018, https://www.etymonline.com/word/homeland. 
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 with others according to a general adequacy with social and political realities of the time period                
in question.  
This study addresses the question of homeland and identity by focusing on the case of               
Algeria and, especially, on the history and cultural character as well as political fate of its Jewish                 
minority population before, during, and after the so-called ​Guerre d’Algérie​. This dramatic            
episode was followed by different emigrations, to France (the original colonial power) and to              
Israel (the newly founded “State of the Jews”), leading to various versions of nostalgérie and               
alternative queries into where one finds “wholeness” as distinct from “holiness” in this world.  
Until 1962, when Algeria officially separated from France after an eight-year long war             
for independence (which was concluded with the Evian Accords), it was the motherland of a               
heterogeneous combination of various distinct local identities associated by one greater national            
identity. One was not simply Algerian, but Algerian Indigenous, European, Muslim, Jewish, all             
of them cultural factions and fractions of identities that, together, shared a homeland while              
establishing their own specific community, or rather ‘nation’ within it. The Algerian Jews, ​les              
Juifs d’Algérie​, for instance, became internally divided by the diverse solicitations of being             
‘Jewish,’ ‘French,’ and ‘Algerian.’ These classifications of which the contours, at first, seem             
flexible, strengthened an ensemble of cultural and social characteristics that were present in the              
culture and that typically forced one to belong to only one distinct category out of the three.                 
Hence the mere being of an ‘Algerian’ posed a problem as it reinforced a territorial origin or one                  
nationality; it thus excluded, in today’s vocabulary, the indigenous Jewish population as well as              
the Europeans who considered themselves Algerian in the sense of belonging to an independent,              
or dependent Algerian nation.  
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 When disregarding the generally accepted assumption of the homeland’s association with           
one’s birthplace, Algerian sub-identities, such as the ones mentioned above, lost their land of              
origin as ‘rightfully’ theirs to claim. This complex seems to have been most prevalent amongst               
the Jewish Diaspora as its members obeyed their God’s order to “Get thee out of thy country, and                  
from thy kindred, and from thy father’s house, unto a land that I will shew thee” thus linking a                   2
theological injunction to another, national one. Indeed, in times times of colonization during             
which a nation is taken over by another, frontiers are blurred to the extent to which one can no                   
longer be sure whether one’s primary dedication is to the supernatural force of God or to the                 
tangible land of a home.  
The very first French stories in Algeria are misleading as they are often presented as               
positive and necessary events. The ‘miserable situation’ and particular character of the ​Juifs             
d’Algérie make their “emancipation” appear as as if it was a humanitarian act, while it was really                 
meant to secure the occupation of the country in question. It is said, that the metropolitan French                 
Jews came to Algeria in order to “civilize” their distant coreligionists, making the ​Juifs d’Algérie               
not only a community just as notable as the colonizers but also, and more importantly to this                 
research, colonizers by proxy. According to data collected by the so-called ​consistoires during             
the 19th century, they became “​auxiliaires de la domination française ” and prominent members             
of the colonial economic elite. We can agree, therefore, with Albert Memmi and George              
Balandier who came to conclude that “​quel que soit leur statut social, ils font partie de cette                 
‘minorité numérique’ mais ‘majorité sociologique​… ​qui a pour fonction de dominer​.’” That            3
2 ​Genesis 12:1.  
3 Pierre-Jean Le Foll Luciani,​ Les Juifs algériens dans la lutte anticoloniale: Trajectoires dissidentes (1934-1965) 
(Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2015), 20. 
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 said, the ​Juifs d’Algérie ​were mostly unwilling agents of a dominating administration. Some             
silently suffered from a devastating European penetration into the territory, altering the            
organization of the community, daily religious practices, language, marriage, and governmental           
instructions. 
The ​Juifs d’Algérie ​were not the only Jews present in North Africa. Jews were also               
established in other French colonial projects along the Mediterranean coast, such as in Tunisia              
and Morocco. However, while both Tunisia, with the Treaty of Bardo on May 12th, 1881, and                
Morocco, with the Treaty of Fez on March 30th, 1912, were declared ​protectorats ​by the French                
government, Algeria was a ​département français​, not only ‘protected,’ but essentially a French             
department within itself. That is to say, while Morocco and Tunisia remained autonomous parts              
of sovereign states, Algeria involuntarily became a part of the French nation. And yet, I’d argue                
that the ​Juifs d’Algérie ​were both ‘protected’ and ‘nationalized,’ as they were both guaranteed              
France’s protection while maintaining their particular ​Judéo-Arabe religious rituals and          
traditions, and also naturally adopted the French collective identity. Hence, the ​Juifs d’Algérie             
themselves became the ​protectorat ​within the geographical extension.  
Evidently, Algeria was not the only country to have been colonized and forced to wage               
war in order to gain its independence. However, Algeria’s destiny widely differs from that of its                
colonized relatives, such as Morocco and Tunisia, due to the extent to which its example was far                 
more complex. A telling example of how the anti-colonial war could have been differently              
concluded is, perhaps, that of South Africa and notably Nelson Mandela’s solution to             
overcoming apartheid on the other pole of the African continent. Mandela chose to accept the               
inevitable cohabitation of both colonizers and colonized, making South Africa the homeland of             
7 
 both. Why is it then, that Algeria’s approach to colonization turned out so different from that of                 
Mandela’s? I would argue that it is because the distinction between the colony and the colonial                
power was blurred in Algeria from the moment it was conceived as a ​département français​, that                
is, not completely a colony, just as it was not completely independent, but as a de facto                 
geographical extension of a colonizing power. In addition, Algeria was once a country of refuge,               
populated by groups who had other, or who would come to have other, designated homelands               
than the one in which they were born. Situated on the same Mediterranean coast, France was                
technically just a boat ride away for those of European descent; by the same token, Israel, the                 
‘holy land’ of the Jewish people, seemed to have been directly promised to those who considered                
themselves to be more Jewish than Algerian (or French, for that matter).  
The even more complex mélange between nationality and religion is also of great             
importance for this broader project. Once the state of Israel was established as a national home                
for the Jewish people, the question of homeland became discoupled from that of birthplace or               
mother tongue. A similar mélange can be discerned between homeland and nationalism, the             
cultural and political movement which gave birth to the concept that Benedict Anderson, in his               
groundbreaking book with the same title, came to designate as “imagined communities.” The             
imagined community, within a pluralistic nation, retains its firm, even if fictional, identity so that               
in reality it inspires two eventual extremes: assimilation or persecution, in other words, the              
syndrome of ‘you’re either with ‘​us​’ or with ‘​them​.’’ In colonial rule, moreover, the “imagined”               
becomes a mere imposition as its yearning loses its rational or, rather, legitimate place in an                
occupied land falsely owned. Perhaps, it is this imposition that further causes perennial             
uncertainty in its subjects, rather than citizens, as they will feel more frail, not to say split in their                   
8 
 identity and experience ever greater difficulty to envision the de facto colony as their imagined               
community, much less their homeland. Both Algeria and Israel provide concrete examples of             
such problematic relationships between people native to the land, who are made indigenous by              
the colonial arrival, and colonizers who had established their own imagined communities in an              
already inhabited homeland (whether of one existing homogenous community or several           
communities that in the meantime had found a way to coexist as a whole). The wide variety of                  
local identities that are known to have (often violently) merged into one national identity,              
devoted from here on to the one homeland, testifies to a universal process of identification and                
estrangement whose effects range from extreme measures taken to complex compromises found.  
Starting in 1870, the ​Juifs d’Algérie had a different nationality than that of their              
homeland. This historical fact leads us to the main questions that will guide us throughout this                
research: how is it that some people succeeded in finding a homeland in Algeria, France, and                
Israel, and did so regardless of place of birth, whereas others did not? And, could one, in                 
principle and in fact, return to a land and feel at home even if one was not born there in the first                      
place? Studying the ​Juifs d’Algérie who were exiled from the motherland of Algeria and found               
themselves in the constructed homelands of France or Israel, a remarkable observation imposes             
itself: it seems that for those who retained a substantial grasp of their original local identity, the                 
national identity eventually developed as a function of the newly constructed homeland. To             
address such questions inspired by the experiences of the ​Juifs d’Algérie​, ​one should first answer               
the preliminary question, namely: how does one construct an identity as a function of a homeland                
which lacks clear geopolitical borders? When hospitality is exclusive to the state and the public               
domain, then a stateless people has no room for being reciprocal in the generous act of                
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 hospitality. It then seems that the essential vulnerability of an identity reveals itself when it is                
threatened by potential displacement, and that a functioning homeland for all will be composed              
by identities once considered ‘Other’ but no longer seen in that threatening light.  
Inspired by Thomas W. Dodman’s ​Homesick Epoch: Dying of Nostalgia in           
Post-Revolutionary France on nostalgia, I will focus on the importance of memory when             
approaching the different components of my research, since memory’s deviations can, in the             
process, be expunged to create new identities. The memory of French Algeria, held onto by the                
various parties involved, therefore prevails as the most important to the process of identity              
formation. To gather the most relevant information derived from such individual and collective             
memory, we will draw on the literature of internationally renowned Jewish French Algerian             
intellectuals such as Jacques Derrida and Hélène Cixous. As Lynne Huffer points out in her               
essay ​Derrida’s Nostalgia​, ​for Derrida “nostalgia happens precisely because we cannot go home             
again” ; Cixous, for her part, agrees as she concludes that “returns are never proportional to us,                4
which is why, for the most part, we miss them.” Such observations render the nostalgic in an                 5
eternally displaced mindset where time and space no longer count as determining factors. In              
conversation with Derrida, my research will also reflect on Pierre Nora’s ​Les Français d’Algérie              
and Derrida’s extensive personal response to this work, in a 52 paged letter addressed to Nora                
himself. We can consider that each of these recounts bears witness to a life of an individual, who                  
is in the process of finding his existence in a succession of lands and social groups all of which                   
are organized around membership and a community thus imagined. A biographical study’s aim is              
4 ​Lynne Huffer, “Derrida’s Nostalgia,” in ​Algeria & France 1800-2000: Identity, Memory, Nostalgia​. ed. Patricia 
M. E. Lorcin (Syracuse NY: Syracuse University Press, 2006), xxi.  
5 ​Samuel Sami Everett, ​The Algerian Works of Hélène Cixous: at the Triple Intersection of European, North 
African, and Religious Nationalisms ​(Springerlink.com, 2017), 215. 
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 to precisely restore the individual trajectories by generalizing them to the level of the trajectories               
of differing groups. With a biographical chronology, a complete stranger gets a glance at “​la               
famille, l’université, l’institution religieuse, la bande d’amis, la troupe de scouts... la prison et le               
camp d’internement​.” They hence give a sense of what it was like to feel Jewish, French, or                 6
Algerian in one common homeland, revealing a logic through which identity dynamically relates             
to a historical and cultural, as well as a political space.  
We will also reflect on personal accounts collected from extensive interviews with            
subjects born in Algeria and displaced to the lands of either France or Israel (or both). Denis                 
Guénoun, a Jewish playwright, dramaturgue and Professor of French literature at the Sorbonne,             
of Algerian descent who was born in Oran, Algeria, and would eventually convert to              
Protestantism in Paris, long after his family’s displacement; Henri Atlan, a world renowned             
Jewish biophysicist and philosopher, residing in both Israel and Paris, and born in Blida, Algeria,               
who would devote his career to the biomedical sciences and to tradition of Jewish mysticism and                
Talmudic commentary; Jean Pierre Lledo, a documentary film maker born in Tlemcen, Algeria,             
who stayed in Algeria until the 1990s, and now resides in Israel, which he claims to be his true                   
homeland; Jacques Leyris, born in Constantine, Algeria, as the son of the renowned musician              
Raymond Leyris, also known as ​Cheikh Raymond​, who was assassinated in Algeria in 1962 after               
the ceasefire was inaugurated, who now lives in the outskirts of Paris and likewise thinks of                
Israel as his homeland; and, lastly, Yossef Charvit, born in 1957 in Constantine, Algeria and               
residing in Israel since 1970, where he is a professor in the Bar Ilan University and specializes in                  
the social and intellectual history of Mediterranean, North African, French, and Israeli Judaism.  
6 ​Luciani, ​Les Juifs algériens dans la lutte anticoloniale​,​ ​26. 
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 Conducted in Hebrew or French (or both), the first question raised during these             
interviews will inquire into this preference of language, revealing a conscious decision as to              
which tongue and idiom is most associated with the idea of home. Indispensable to my research                
overall, these oral sources will be central to the formulation of its central hypothesis as they will                 
permit us to truly understand what other sources do not or cannot evoke or describe. Finally, to                 
get a clearer sense of the general concepts guiding this project, we will make use of literature on                  
identity, religion, and nationalism, which will be referred to throughout the thesis, whenever             
relevant for its argument. Starting from the position that our knowledge of reality, including the               
domain of human action, as Edward W. Saïd would say, is a social construction by human actors,                
a group of interpretative methods will be deployed in order to better understand the modern                7
phenomenon of home and homeland in a comprehensive and holistic way. In so doing, the thesis                
will focus on analyzing practices of human subjects (investigating the reasons for why, how, or               
by what means people do the things they do), while also showing how these practices, thus                
reconstructed, can be used to generate observable outcomes.  
Despite this research’s focus on the relationships among displacement, identity, and           
homeland inspired by Algeria’s colonial past, the Algerian War of Independence, and the fates of               
its subjects as they moved on, we must not overlook the severity of this ​guerre sans nom                 
(nameless war), which remained unacknowledged for the war that it was, even some 40 years               
after it “ended.” In reading through these rationalizations, one is reminded of Hannah Arendt’s              
conclusions regarding the atrocities committed by operatives of the German Nazi regime            
(Eichmann among them).  
7 Edward W. Saïd, “Knowledge and Power,” in ​Covering Islam​. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, London and 
Henley, 1978), 129-153. 
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 Displacement by war brings about a blurring of the contours of identities as they relate to                
national territory and homeland narratives.The underlying framework that defines France’s          
domination over Algeria was that of violence, which was central to the colonial experience from               
the inception of Algeria’s occupation in 1830 until its independence in 1962. For Algeria, the               
conclusion of the war was a vindication of the longstanding negation by the French of Algeria’s                
claim to a national homeland. For France, the loss of a once geographical extension was a                
political, economic, and psychological loss, ranging from acute relief to bitter rage. 
As this research concentrates on different specific geographical locations, distinct          
sections of the thesis will be dedicated to individual exiles from a homeland, including the initial                
exiles to Algerian as they found themselves embarking upon the task of constructing yet another.               
The first chapter will explain how the many Jews in Algeria coming from very different origins                
came to be known as the ensemble known as the ​Juifs d’Algérie​. Their existence in the land of                  
Algeria can be divided into three distinct time periods with their corresponding identities, which              
cover the pre-1830s, the years between 1830 and 1870, and the period post-1870. During these               
times, we encounter the ​Judéo-Berbères​, the Arab speaking ​Judéo-Arabes​, and the Europeanized            
Algerian Jews, respectively. The second chapter will be dedicated to the ​Juifs d’Algérie ​during              
the period known as ​La Guerre d’Algérie​; it will consider their initial sense of belonging, the                
eventual choices of homelands, and the geographic and mental displacements these choices            
entailed. It will heavily rely on Pierre-Jean le Foll Luciani’s ​Les juifs d’Algérie face aux               
nationalités française et algérienne (1940-1963) to get a clearer sense of the identity complex              
the war produced. The third chapter, finally, will analyze different Algerian Jews in the              
aftermath of their displacement to another homeland, and will strongly rely on personal accounts              
13 
 collected from interviews conducted during the month of January, 2018, in Paris and Jerusalem.              
All chapters will draw from Benjamin Stora’s ​Les clés retrouvées, une enfance juive à              
Constantine​, a sort of an unconducted interview in which Stora answers several of this research               
questions. In addition, Stora’s ​C’était hier en Algérie: de l’Orient à la République, une histoire               
des Juifs d’Algérie will provide historical background throughout the research, as unforgettable            
images fill this nostalgic scrapbook dedicated to the Jewish existence in Algeria. 
The materials gathered in the interviews with the exiled and the wider information             
collected in the three chapters, summarized above, will subsequently be generalized in a             
conclusion which is divided into two parts. Doing so, will allow us to detect and interpret the                 
broader phenomenon of the experiences made by Jewish and Muslim populations in their             
respectives imaginings of community in the constructed homelands, in and beyond their actual             
places of birth. After having analyzing the biographical narratives of individual subjects, based             
on the literature and my interviews, I will concentrate here on their surroundings rather than               
personal experiences. I will examine the similarities and differences, whether they be aesthetic or              
cultural, between the homelands of Algeria and Israel, whose citizenship (in Algeria) was and is               
(in Israel) determined by the Jewish religious faith. In order to better grasp the significance of the                 
homeland for the Jewish community I will borrow insights from Avishai Margalit’s public             
lecture, entitled “Isaiah Berlin, Home and Homeland,” ​which provides both an extensive            
historical and personal narrative of the creation of Israel and its significance. I will briefly invoke                
the differences and similarities between French Algeria and the State of Israel as colonial              
powers, and ponder the status of Muslim Algerians and Palestinians who, as peoples and              
populations, suffered a similar fate of being made indigenous in their very own land. In an                
14 
 attempt to understand how an entity is preserved when the return to it is deemed impossible, this                 
concluding section will further draw on some relevant motifs discussed by Bruce Lincoln’s ​Holy              
Terrors, Thinking about Religion after September 11​, which offers a clarifying account of the              
relationship between culture and religion in postcolonial nation-states. I will suggest that not             
only the migrations from France to Israel, the so called ‘Aliyahs’ after 1962, but also the more                 
recent wave, following the 2015 attacks, which revived terrorism often attributed to            
anti-semitism in France and Europe as a whole, enable us to redefine and more forcefully address                
the disastrous racisms that our modern nations sustain until this very day.  
With this latest twist of history, it seems the fates of the three homelands of Algeria,                
France, and Israel come together. Our analysis thus yields the paradoxical result of what an               
identity’s displacement from the homeland entails, as the example of the ​Juifs d’Algérie , makes              
more than clear, and helps explain how a homeland or, rather a sense of home and belonging (​ubi                  
bene​, ​ibi patria​), can be constructed or reimagined, regardless of birthplace, wherever one goes.              
It also makes clear that, in this process, several and equally valid, historical narratives of home,                
of leaving and returns to a land, will, almost inevitably and not without tension, end up                
overlapping. 
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 Les Juifs d’Algérie  
 
The particularity of this research entails the ‘mutations’ of different identities throughout            
a very long history. One can envision a family tree, composed of identities belonging to the same                 
root, but branching out due to differing circumstances. Religion, combined with nationality, can             
be identified as the seed from which such a tree stemmed. Planted on Algerian soil, the figure of                  
the tree and its branches captures the relatively constant identifying characteristics of the             
different categories of people found in its region, country or nation. The figure would further               
symbolize that the transformation of each generation contributes to this research’s overarching            
claim that, in fact, identity serves as a function of the homeland. To tackle the questions of                 
identity in relation to homeland and the experience of displacement, this research, as announced,              
will focus on three specific Jewish identities found in Algeria throughout a timeline made up of                
three eras. The ​Judéo-Berbères​, present in Algeria since 586 BCE, the Arab Speaking ​Juifs              
d’Algérie ​indigènes​, as categorized by the French, and the French ​Juifs d’Algérie​, who in 1870               
were made French citizens by a decree and who adopted France as their homeland as               
relinquished Algeria as their “home.” Retaining its geographical borders, yet continuously           
governed by different administrations, Algeria proves identity, specifically the Jewish identity, to            
be a function of the homeland. The ‘regeneration’ of the ​Juifs d’Algérie​, a process of               
assimilation termed by the French colonial project, marked an unforeseen rupture between            
generations whose distinction and disconnection would, from here on, be burdened by much             
more than merely the separation by time.  
The beginning of the Jewish presence in North Africa marks the starting point of this               
chapter’s itinerary. After the kingdoms of Israel and Judah came into existence, Jewish traders,              
16 
 referred to as Phoenicians by the Greeks, traveled westward along the African coast. From 323 to                
331 BCE, under the Ptolemaic Greeks, the Jews brought their technological, industrial, and             
commercial expertise to Alexandria, one of the largest and most economically important cities of              
antiquity. In 305 BCE, Jewish settlements spread across North Africa and composed a significant              
proportion of the major North African Canaanite settlement at Carthage (pronounced ​Kart            
Hadash​, meaning “New City” in Hebrew). By the end of the Common Era, the Jewish               
population in North Africa approached two million, of whom a majority resided in the large               
cities of Saïd and Memphis, and the others across East and South Alexandria. They established               
ports that turned into trading centers along the Mediterranean coast and benefited immensely             
from the consequent economic exchange. One of the most prominent commercial sites was in              
Ikoshim, later known as Algiers.  
In 813 BCE, by virtues of race and language, the Phoenician identity mutated into that of                
the ​Berber people found in the West of Egypt. Impressed with the erudition and technological               
acumen of the Jews, the Berbers welcomed the latter when they fled the intolerant policies of the                 
Roman Emperor, Justinian the Great. The ​Berbères ​adopted the Jews’ semitic origins, and             
created our first category of ​Juifs d’Algérie​: the ​Judéo-Berbères. ​Made up of various tribes, the               
Berbères retained their Hamitic languages, specifically Tuareg and Kabyle, and their militaristic            
culture. Together, as a mixed population, the ​Judéo-Berbères faced the invasions of the             
Phoenicians, Romans, Vandals (one of the German tribes that vanquished the Roman Empire),             
Byzantines, and finally the Arabs. As told by the Muslim medieval historian Ibn-Khaldun, this              
episode in history was led by Kahina (“Priestess” in Hebrew), a ​Judéo-Berbère queen who in               
694 CE led the Djeraoura tribes, composed of ​Judéo-Berbères​, ​to resist the Arab conquest of the                
17 
 Maghreb (today’s Algeria and farther West.) A​lthough this is a story that heavily leans on               8
legendary sources, Kahina has since been regarded as a symbol of the ​Judéo-Berbère ​culture by               
French colonialists, Algerian nationalists, Jewish nationalists, Berberists, Feminists, Muslim         
Arab historians, and this project.  
Eventually in 701 CE, after a period of undisturbed hegemony free from foreign             
domination, the ​Judéo-Berbères failed to mobilize against an Arab army composed of 60,000             
troops. Kahina was beheaded, and her soldiers faced the all too familiar choice of the Jewish                9
people between assimilation and persecution. Following the Arab conquest, nearly all           
Judéo-Berbères ​were Islamicized and the 50,000 who refused were massacred. The converted,            
along with those who managed to evade persecution, began their cultural and linguistic             
assimilation into the Arab culture. They rapidly began developing familiarity with Arabic            
literature, grammar, science, and spoke Arabic as their daily language of cultural and traditional              
instruction. The ​Judéo-Berbères from here on became a function of their governing homeland as              
their identity slowly mutated into a daily endeavor to serve it. In 711 CE, the Arab army, this                  
time joined by the converted, headed for Spain, where we find our next component of the ​Juifs                 
d’Algérie​.  
There is a substantial lack of research on the seven centuries that followed the Arab               
conquest of Algeria; we must assume that this undocumented time in history consisted of the               
Judéo-Berbères​’s progressive assimilation and construction of an Arabic homeland.         
Documentation pertinent to our research resumes in the late 13th century, during which Jews              
8 ​“History of the Jews in Algeria .” ​Holocaust | History of the Jews in Algeria​, 2009, Accessed April 25, 2018, 
www.projetaladin.org/holocaust/en/muslims-and-jews/muslims-and-jews-in-history/history-of-the-jews-in-algeria.ht
ml​.  
9 ​Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, “Jews and Berbers,” Amazigh.nl, last modified May 20, 2008, accessed April 25, 
2018, http://www.amazigh.nl/awar/index.php?topic=12381.0%Bwap2. 
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 were targeted in Spain by an anti-semitic regime instituted centuries before by the Visigoth kings               
in Spain. They were “flogged, executed, their property confiscated, subjected to ruinous taxes,             
forbidden to trade, and, at times, dragged to the baptismal font.” These tortures inspired the               10
Spanish Inquisition that persecuted those who did not follow the Catholic faith and which              
eventually exiled some 200,000 Spanish Jews on July 30​th​, 1492. The Spanish Jews, placed in a                
single category of so-called ​Sephardim​, coming from the Hebrew name for those of Spanish              
origin, reached North Africa and added to a Jewish presence specific to Algeria until 1830.  
The waves of Sephardic immigration transformed the geography of the Jewish diaspora.            
In 1507, the Spanish army conquered the ports of Oran and Mers el-Kébir together with the                
so-called Moriscos. Jewish families and communities of Ladino speaking Jews resided in the             11
conquered ports of Oran and Mers and by 1518 became one with the dominating Ottoman               
empire. Identifying with their new surroundings, the languages spoken by the ​Juifs d’Algérie             
expanded to include not only Berber and Arabic, but also Spanish, Ladino (a uniquely              
conservative dialect of Spanish), Italian (as Jewish Italian merchants from the Italian trading             
center of Livorno joined Algeria’s European Spring), and Hebrew. Having acquired this variety             
of languages, the dominantly Arab speaking ​Juifs d’Algérie became cultural associates and            
mediators between Algeria’s different cohabitants. The presumed territorial atmospheres were          
later described in vivid terms by another son of Algeria, the Nobel Prize winning Albert Camus,                
in his book​ L’Été, Petit guide​:  
10 ​“Hebrew History Federation.” ​HHF Factpaper: Jews in Africa, Part I - The Berbers and the Jews​, 
www.hebrewhistory.info/factpapers/fp019-1_africa.htm. 
11 The Moriscos add an interesting perspective since, like the ​Judéo-Berbères​,​ ​they witnessed a conversion and 
expulsion as well. Converted from​ ​Islam to Christianity by coercion, they were nevertheless expelled from Spain by 
a decree of King Philippe III on April 9th, 1609.  
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 “La douceur d’Alger est plutôt italienne. L’éclat cruel d’Oran a quelque chose 
d’espagnol… Constantine fait penser à Tolède… Alger offre une ville arabe, Oran un 
village nègre et un quartier espagnol, Constantine un quartier Juif.”  12
 
Associates of all, and thus either despised or preferred as allies, the ​Juifs d’Algérie ​were               
throughout their Algerian history assigned different protective statuses in order to place them as              
a neutral people or population on one side while “protecting” them from the other. Under the                
Ottoman Empire in the 16th century, they were protected by the official status of ​dhimmi​,               
meaning ​protected​. Incorporated by the Pact of Umar and imposed by the Turks, the status               13
protected all non-Muslim ‘people of the book’ from persecution. Still, although technically            
protected, their most basic rights were often severely jeopardized. As the arrival of the French               
Jews during the second half of the 17th century called for more trade opportunities and               
mediation, the ​Juifs d’Algérie ​avoided the marginalizing discriminations by becoming relatively           
economically successful. In fact, this economic thriving is related indirectly by the well-known             
tale of the debt that was owed to two Algerian Jewish merchants, Bacri and Busnachi, in a                 
dramatic story that traces all the way back to France’s initial incentive to colonize Algeria.  
Even prior to the French conquest of Algeria, Napoléon had deemed the Jewish people “a               
nation within a nation.” Accordingly, he formulated policies that intended to “govern, monitor,             
police and ultimately guide the masses of Jews in local communities towards morality, economic              
utility, and assimilation.” ​Given Napoleon’s incentive to politically emancipate Jews under           14
France’s rule, he designed a representative body that could specifically address the matters             
relevant to the Jewish population within the empire. In 1806, he convened an assembly of               
12 ​ ​Benjamin Stora, ​Les clés retrouvées, Une enfance juive à Constantine​, (Paris: Stock 2015), 29. 
13 “Dhimmi.” ​Dhimmi - New World Encyclopedia​, www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Dhimmi. 
14 Joshua S. Schreier, “They Swore Upon the Tombs Never to Make Peace with Us: Algerian Jews and French 
Colonialism, 1845-1848,” in ​Algeria & France 1800-2000: Identity, Memory, Nostalgia​. ed. Patricia M. E. Lorcin 
(Syracuse NY: Syracuse University Press, 2006), 102. 
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 notable metropolitan French Jews to discuss strategies to make this community just as European              
as Jewish. Together, they turned Napoléon’s policies into a hierarchical and centralized system             
of so-called ​consistoires ​led by a ​consistoire central​, which was established in Paris, the              
empire’s capital. 
In 1836, six years after the French colonization of Algeria began, the ​consistoire              
appealed to the French Minister of War to now install the surprisingly successful ​consistoires ​in               
Algeria as well, claiming that ​“the conquest of Algeria, in adding a new trophy to the glory of                  
our nation, has torn from slavery a population stooped for centuries under the yoke of barbary.”                
(Consistoire Central, 1836). The ​consistoires israélites ​in Algeria, established in Algiers, Oran,            15
and Constantine, on November 9th, 1845, addressed the place and status of our second category               
of ​Juifs d’Algérie indigènes and forever changed the dynamics in and, eventually, also             
aesthetiques associated with Algeria. One of this project’s interviewees, Denis Guénoun, reflects            
on the complex terminology and rather absurd process of its definition: 
“Les Juifs qui étaient indigènes, ça veut dire qu’ils étaient de l'Algérie [...] 
Quant le décret a été publié, on a demandé aux juifs d'aller se faire inscrire pour être                 
naturalisé français, Alors tous l'ont fait, bien sûr, de très bon coeur, parce que la condition                
française était avantageuse, et aussi pour des raisons intellectuelles culturelles que la            
France c'était la liberté, le pays ou les juifs avaient le droit à vivre, etc… Mais, beaucoup                 
ne parlaient pas français. [...] 
Ils ont dû prouver qu'ils étaient indigènes. Mon arrière grand-père quand il est allé              
déclarer lui même, sa femme, ses enfants, et petits enfants, il a dû prouver qu'il était                
indigène. Comment il prouve qu'il était indigène? Et bien, selon le truc juridique (​il rit​)               
c'est tellement drôle, il fallait des témoignages, qui attestent qu'il était indigène, qu'il était              
là avant la colonisation. C'est un peu ridicule tu vois? Il a eu des témoignages qui ne                 
parlaient pas français non plus! Donc indigène ça voulait dire que ce judaïsme là, et pas                
un autre, qui a été naturalisé français. Alors pourquoi? C'est compliqué, ça c'est pas fait ni                
au Maroc alors que là à Oran c'est tout près du Maroc. Donc indigènes ça veut dire ça,                  
mais pour nous ça veut dire des arabes. [...] Nous quand on disait des indigènes dans la                 
langue courante des Français d'Algérie c'était pour des arabes. On disait des arabes mais              
15 Ibid., 104. 
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 ça paraissait un peu brutal, alors on disait ça, a priori, et on disait des indigènes. [...]                 
C'était ambigu tu vois parce que nous aussi on était indigène…”  16
 
Guenoun provides us with the enlightening insight that one in fact had to prove one’s               
‘indigenousness ness.’ On the same topic, Frantz Fanon, a psychiatrist originating from the             
French ​département d’outre mer ​of Martinique and considered one of Algeria’s adopted sons             
due to the vast amount of work he dedicated to its cultural and political turmoils, also reflected                 
on the indigenous category: 
“​La première chose que l’indigène apprend, c’est à rester à sa place, à ne pas dépasser les                 
limites; c’est pourquoi les rêves de l’indigène sont des rêves musculaires, des rêves             
d’action, des rêves agressifs. Je rêve que je saute, que je nage, que je cours, que je                 
grimpe. Je rêve que j’éclate de rire, que je franchis le fleuve d’une enjambée, que je suis                 
poursuivi par une meute de voitures qui ne me rattrapent jamais. Pendant la colonisation,              
le colonisé n’arrête pas de se libérer entre neuf heures du soir et six heures du matin.                 
Cette agressivité sédimentée dans ses muscles, le colonisé va d’abord la manifester contre             
les siens.”  17
 
Fanon thus explained why the remaining indigenous Algerians were capable of extremities            
triggered by the severe exclusion. By the end of the 19th century, 44,000 out of 54,000 Algerian                 
Jews were indigenous and the remaining 11,000 were ​prolétaires​, belonging to a middle lower              
class. These ​Juifs d’Algérie indigènes ​became the French Jews’ personal project as Algeria             
became France’s colonial project, further complicating the already established understanding of           
identity and homeland.  
The French metropolitan Jews felt that the ​Juifs d’Algérie ​were long subjugated to             
persecution and would therefore be more susceptible to embrace all the potential benefits of              
French domination. Making it a priority to advance their inferior distant coreligionists, in 1841,              
Jewish Rabbinical courts (referred to as beth din at the time, from the Hebrew for “court”) were                 
16 ​Denis Guénoun, personal interview, January 19, 2018. 
17 ​Anne Mathieu, “Frantz Fanon, La négritude et l'émancipation.” ​Le Monde Diplomatique​, (1 Mar. 2009), accessed 
April 23, 2018, www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2009/03/MATHIEU/16934. 
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 placed under French jurisdiction and linked to the ​Consistoire Central ​in Paris. ​Notified of the               
“Jewish suffering” in pre-colonial North Africa through the ​Archives Israélites​, a prominent            
primary source and French Jewish journal initially published in 1840, French Jews were ready to               
convince a skeptical French government that the ​Juifs d’Algérie would ultimately prove useful to              
the French Republic. In order to sustain the metropole’s dedication to its Jewish Algerian              
brothers, the ​Archives ​stated that “the Israelite population has only found in France protection              
and liberty,” and “has attached itself to France with the ardor of sincere gratitude” .              18
Accordingly, the perception of the ​Juifs d’Algérie as victims spared by imperial generosity             
encouraged the metropolitan determination to assimilate them through naturalization.  
Yet, the initial gap between the Western and North African populations and their             
collective identities, predominantly referred to in European culture as the difference between            
Occident and ​Orient​, prevailed in minor details. The ​consistoires​’ Chief Rabbi’s position was             
strictly reserved for the presumably more sophisticated French Jews found in or brought to              
Algeria, while the ​Juifs d’Algérie indigènes ​were allowed only irrelevant membership in the             
prefectures. Increasingly aware of what disenfranchised measures their imposed inferiority as           
indigenous could entail, the ​Juifs d’Algérie indigènes initially resisted the French implantation in             
Algeria, to the extent that in some cases, local Jews refused to allow French Jewish burials in                 
Algerian Jewish cemeteries. Perhaps understandingly, as the ​consistoires ​intended “to inculcate           
unconditional obedience to the laws, loyalty to France, and the obligation to defend it,” the               19
Juifs d’Algérie ​viewed them as an intrusive and impious force usurping the power from their               
communities. 
18 Schreier, “They Swore,​”​ 105, (AI 1843, 26). 
19 “History of the Jews in Algeria .” ​Holocaust | History of the Jews in Algeria​, (2009). 
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 Nevertheless, as new generations were born into ​l’Algérie Française​, the ​Juifs d’Algérie​,             
who doubled in number from 10,000 in 1830 to 23,000 in 1847, were increasingly Europeanized               
through two specific institutions: the army and school. Until 1842, Jewish education in Algeria              
was reserved for only men and excluded young women from learning Hebrew or discussing              
sacred texts. The Jewish Algerian education system was composed of two specific programs:             
l’école française​, and ​l’école Talmudique ​(also known as ​l’Alliance israélite universelle.​)           
Intended to unite against anti-semitism and to embed the principles of the French civilization,              
equality and fraternity were the guiding principles of each. Students were instructed in either              
French or Hebrew (emphasizing the proper education of Judaism) or both.  
Yet, with the French arrival and the implantation of its education system, a large number               
of Jewish ​fillettes started attending a school that, from 1882 onwards, was exactly modeled after               
the one Jules Ferry established in France and, hence, secular, obligatory, and free. The ​Juives               
d’Algérie ​were thus introduced to a whole new world whose republican ideals of ​liberté, égalité,               
and fraternité​, offered an unfamiliar horizon of uncharted possibilities. For one thing, their             
education completely modified the mental perspective of the young female Jewish Algerian            
students compared to the world they were born into. For another, these educational practices              20
dignified the French identity. And having been Algerian, French, and Jewish, through and             
through, the young female ​Juives d’Algérie acquired an openness for “the Other” that the              
majority of men were incapable of embracing. 
Due to this research’s disproportionate attention to female Jewish Algerians, it is            
important to emphasize the substantial role they played in our story. Indeed, the ​Juives d’Algérie               
20 ​Joëlle Allouche Benayoun, “Femmes juives d’Algérie” in Juifs d’Algérie; ​Exposition du 28 septembre 2012 au 27 
janvier 2013​, (Paris; Musée d’art et d’histoire du Judaïsme et Skira-Flammarion, 2012 - 2013) , 216.  
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 where the group that most quickly adopted the European virtue of education. Between 1896 and               
1962, 20% of the hundreds of literary works published by ​Juifs d’Algérie ​were written by Juives                
d’Algérie​: novels, poetry, autobiographies, and plays. However, and unfortunately, if a woman            21
was to receive a Bachelor Degree and wished to find a suitable profession, she had no choice but                  
to leave Algeria, making France more appealing and the greater resource as a homeland than her                
place of birth and home in Algeria. Yet, traditionally, the women of the Jewish Algerian               
community were expected not to use whatever educational achievements or degrees they had             
attained and rather to concentrate on helping their husbands. It was only in the ​entre deux                
guerres ​time period (1918-1939) that some managed to become teachers or doctors, and this              
always with a great deal of difficulty. At the same time, the ​Juives d’Algérie​’s battle for greater                 
equality, sustained by a sociological and psychological evolution and inspired by the adoption of              
France as a homeland, placed the two distant groups of female French Jews and ​Juives d’Algérie​,                
both marginalized by gender,  de facto in the same category, regardless of social location .  
With the inauguration of the French education system taking up most of the public space,                
not only did Jewish Algerian customs and traditions relocated to ​l’espace privé from ​l’espace              
public​, but also slowly transformed names and attitudes, embodying the signs of European             
symbolism. Rabbis progressively lost their influence in civil life as Algeria was increasingly             
secularized and subjected to the laws of the State. Yet with France’s intervention, controversial              
as the colonial gesture it remained, the ​Juifs d’Algérie ​had now also the opportunity to embrace                
their potential of becoming what one might call “Westerners.” They were offered and             
accordingly took up positions of higher esteem, excelled in their suddenly accessible education,             
21 ​Ibid., 218. 
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 and became readier to abandon not only the world of poverty, but also their status of an                 
indigenous population that still legally differentiated them from those they were gradually            
becoming.  
Shortly after Napoleon the III’s first venture to French Algeria and the establishment of              
l’Alliance Israélite universelle in 1860, local Algerian Jewish representatives started presenting           
French officials with various petitions to no longer be considered as indigenous in their own               
land. Acknowledging such a possibility, the ​sénatus-consulte du 14 juillet 1865 sur l’état des              
personnes et la naturalisation en Algérie ​declared that all peoples indigenous to Algeria could              
potentially become French citizens. Composed of five distinct articles, the consulate addressed            
each collective identity indigenous to Algeria and the specific requirements for it to officially              
become French: “​l’​indigène musulman est français: néanmoins, il continuera à être régi par la              
loi musulmane… Il peut sur sa demande, être admis à jouir des droits de citoyen français​;”                
“​l’​indigène israélite est français​;” “​l’​étranger qui justifie de trois années de résidence en             
Algérie.​” The fourth and the fifth articles, moreover, clarified the conditions that one had to be of                 
“l’âge de vingt-et-un ans accomplis, conférée par décret impérial rendu en Conseil d’État” ​and              
that ​“les formes dans lesquelles seront instruites les demandes prévues par les articles 1, 2 et 3                 
du présent sénatus-consulte​.”   22
As one of the Third Republic’s guiding principles was that of ​laïcité​, secularism, the most               
crucial condition for the French citizenship was the abandonment of the indigenous’ ​status             
personnel​. France made it an ultimatum that if one was to be of its nationality, public religion                 
and privately practiced religion had to undergo a substantial detachment. Unwilling, and frankly             
22 ​Benjamin Stora, ​C’était hier en Algérie: de l’Orient à la République, une histoire des Juifs d’Algérie ​(Larousse, 
2016), 182. 
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 not very interested in relinquishing their religious prerogatives, ​out of the 35,000 indigenous             
Jews, only between 200 to 300 solicited the opportunity, and only around 150 obtained it in the                 23
five years that followed the 1865 consultation. According to Michel Abitbol, this massive refusal              
was linked to a sort of religious liberty unknown to the metropolitan French Jews, where religion                
was a given rather than seen as nuisance to be accommodated: “They felt that they hardly needed                 
this [legal] emancipation which, in addition to its religious drawbacks, deprived them of their              
collective autonomy.”   24
According to the French minister of Justice at the time, Adolphe Crémieux, a French Jew               
himself, the Jewish religion forbids rebellion against the state and its laws. He proclaimed that               
one should not propose the French citizenship to the Juifs d’Algérie but rather impose it in the                 
name of their new ​Patrie (the French term for homeland). Unaware of the potential upheaval               
such a proposition had in store, on October 24th, 1870, the ​Décret Crémieux ​was inaugurated               
and transformed the category of ​Juifs d’Algérie indigènes into the third category of French ​Juifs               
d’Algérie​. The decree was signed in Tours by Léon Gambetta, Alexandre Glais-Bizoin, and             
Martin Fourichon, all well-known French statesmen, and declared the 35,000 “​israélites           
indigènes des départements de l’Algérie citoyens français​.” The decree declared that their            25
“​statut réel et leur statut personnel ​would, from here on, be regulated by “​la loi française​”                
adding that “tous droits acquis jusqu’à ce jour ​would remain inviolables​,” while it also               
abolished ​“toute disposition législative, tout sénatus-consulte, décret, règlement ou ordonnances          
contraires​.” Despite initial conflicts concerning the distinctions between Sephardic Jewish          26
23 Luciani, ​Les Juifs algériens dans la lutte anticoloniale​, 14. 
24 Ibid., 14. 
25 Stora, ​C’était hier en Algérie​, 183. 
26 Ibid., 183. 
27 
 religious law and French law, within a generation, this last category of ​Juifs d’Algérie came to                
predominantly speak French rather than Ladino, Hebrew, or Arabic. The importance of language             
will be further analyzed in the third chapter, but for now, it suffices to reiterate its role in the                   
identity formation:  
“Speaking a certain language (including dialect, subdialect, and local accent) is also            
important, particularly if we understand this to include sharing not just language per se,              
but a repertoire of stories, proverbs, jokes, and formulaic expressions, or even a             
textualized canon. One might extend the sense of “language” further still to include             
nonverbal systems of signification like art, architecture, dance, and music, or one might             
treat these as separate geres. But in either case, the extent to which one engages with                
local idioms and signifying practices conditions one’s participation in culture.”  27
 
The French collective identity thus became an inherent component of the Jewish Algerian             
collective identity. Yet, while the ​Juifs d’Algérie ​were going through this transformation at times              
referred to as an identity “mutation,” their Algerian Muslims neighbors remained indigenous in             
their own but now Europeanized land, and, worse yet, witnessed their ancient cohabitants             
become one with the oppressors.  
The time period between the French conquest of Algeria and the official naturalization of              
this ​minorité numérique’ mais ‘majorité sociologique prompt a discussion on the relationship            
between the ​Juifs d’Algérie and the French civilizing mission. The possible justifications for why              
the ​Juifs d’Algérie ​should be the ​indigènes ​to be assimilated rather than the ​Musulmans d’Algérie               
were largely based on stereotypes of the religiously confined image of the female: the              
sequestered Muslim woman who “under thick veils, avoiding our civilization,” was limited to             
visible insignificance, in comparison to the Jewish woman, who “goes out with an exposed face,               
or happily entertains guests in her home for friendly evenings” and follows the European              28
27 Bruce Lincoln, ​Holy Terrors: Thinking About Religion After September 11​ (University of Chicago Press, 2008), 
51. 
28 ​Schreier, “They Swore,” 106. 
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 model. Moreover, the ​Archives ​advocated that the Jews’ displacements throughout history           
sharpened their intelligence so that they could learn the language, culture, accents, and             
instructions of a governing body, whether tolerant or authoritarian. Faced with the choice to              
either cultivate “these men to the level of others regarding civilization and morality, or leave               
them stagnating for years to come in a demoralized, fanatic state” (Archives Israélites 1844,              
691), France’s Third Republic secured this “regeneration” through its relatively inclusive           29
ideals.  
By becoming French however, the ​Juifs d’Algérie belonged not only to different but also              
contradicting collective identities: the Algerian, the French, and the Jewish, on the one hand, the               
colonized, the colonizer, and the religious, on the other. The artificial disjunction between the              
Jewish identity and the Algerian identity, mediated by the French identity, began in 1897 and               
1898 with the rise of anti-semitism. The ​Juifs d’Algérie were denied both public and private               
access to various locations and became victims of daily targetings, while the French army, in               
which they served, stood idle. Strikingly reluctant in providing for the protection of its Jewish               
subjects, France committed its first failure as a presumed homeland and safe haven. Such lack of                
protection was supported by the French Europeans residing in Algeria, known as ​Pieds Noirs              
after their eventual displacement or return to France, who found the assimilation of the ​Juifs               
d’Algérie ​to be​ ​unjustified and unnecessary.  
In 1871, anti-Jewish manifestations proliferated in the two territories once perceived as            
homelands. Both French and Algerian representatives such as Max Régis, elected mayor of             
Algiers at the age of twenty-five and leader of the Anti-Jewish party, and Adolphe Thiers, the                
29 Ibid.,  104.  
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 head of France’s provisional government, called for the Crémieux decree’s abrogation.           
Propaganda rife with xenophobic attacks targeted the ​Juifs d’Algérie to the extent that every              
municipal council in Algeria became controlled by anti-Semites. The hostile anti-semitic           
ambiance was not only present all around Algeria, as witnessed by the formation of an               
Anti-Jewish Party, but also in 1894 Europe, notably marked by the Dreyfus Affair, the most               
tense political drama to concern the Jewish people in French history, during which Alfred              
Dreyfus, a French Jew, was accused of treason and decommissioned from his military position. 
In 1897, when Émile Zola was brought to trial for his article ​J’accuse ​published in               
l’Horreur​, which exposed the injustice directed at Dreyfus, the response in Algeria was severe.              
Over 158 Jewish owned shops in Algiers were looted and burnt and two Jews were killed. In                 30
1899, it has been observed, thirty-six ​anti-juifs ​candidates won the municipal elections ... and              
four out of the six seats in the legislative elections went to Anti-Jewish representatives :              31
Édouard Drumont, who authored one of anti-semitism’s foundations, ​La France Juive​, and            
Charles Marchel from Algiers, Émile Morinaud from Constantine, and Firmin Faure from Oran.             
When the Republican forces won in 1902, anti-semitism lost its momentum, and the construction              
of France as a homeland resumed just in time for its greatest need in manpower: the two World                  
Wars and ​la Guerre d’Algérie​.  
The conclusion of wars often depend on the extent of a nation’s zeal. The World Wars                
were therefore an ideal opportunity for both the ​Juifs d’Algérie ​and France to assume the oath to                 
defend the homeland and its citizens. In August of 1914, around 14,000 ​Juifs d’Algérie ​fought as                
French citizens in the Zouaves regiments; 1,700 lost their lives while 1,300 were imprisoned in               
30 Stora, ​C’était hier en Algérie​, ​96. 
31 Exhibition Catalogue, ​Juifs d’Algérie; Exposition du 28 septembre 2012 au 27 janvier 2013​, (Paris; Musée d’art et 
d’histoire du Judaïsme et Skira-Flammarion, 2012 - 2013), 15. 
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 the name of the ​Patrie​. Despite their prevalent dedication, worthy of a mausoleum constructed              32
in Algiers’ Saint-Eugène cemetery, nationalist groups (composed of more than 40,000 members),            
together with the ​Pieds Noirs​, ​retained their anti-semitic stance. ​In the 1920s, the elections in               
Oran were dominated by virulent campaigns advocating an electoral program solely based on             
anti-semitism. Jules Molle was elected mayor of Oran in 1921 mainly on the basis of his promise                 
“​votez pour moi, c’est voter contre les juifs!​” ​He was re-elected in 1925. Constantly reinforced,               33
anti-semitism culminated in the ​émeutes de Constantine on August 5th, 1934, during which 23              
Juifs d’Algérie were murdered, 80 were injured, and about 200 Jewish owned stores were              
demolished in the streets of Constantine.   34
The gruesome event left the Jewish community petrified and abandoned. The only public             
representatives who were aware of the mere artificiality of the ​Judéo-Musulman tensions so             
effectively orchestrated by the French were the religious Jewish and Muslim Algerian leaders.             
They called for a reconciliation and advocated that both communities, which had originated in              
the very land on which they were turned against one another by a force from the outside, could                  
coexist peacefully once again. In addition, individual ​Juifs d’Algérie​, such as Henri Aboulker,             
Albert Confino, and Elie Gozlan established an ​oeuvre sociale , a social project, ​as an attempt to                35
restore the lost kinship. We will return to Aboulker and Gozlan below. 
The Jewish French Algerian generation that came of age during the ​entre deux guerres              
period was composed of individuals who identified as anti-colonialists and as advocates of             
Algeria’s independence, provided their Algerian and French nationalities would have a place            
32 Ibid., 18. 
33 Stora, ​C’était hier en Algérie​, 139. 
34 Ibid., 132. 
35 Exhibition Catalogue, ​Juifs d’Algérie​, 11. 
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 within it. They supported the election of ​le Front Populaire ​and the many Algerians of Jewish                
origins who participated in the SFIO, ​Section française de l’internationale Ouvrière​, founded by             
the PSF, ​Parti Socialiste Français​, in 1936 further contributed to what came to be known as the                 
Blum Viollette Project. Administered by the ​Président du Conseil​, Léon Blum, and the governor              
general of Algeria, Maurice Viollette, the project attempted to create another version of the              
Décret Crémieux ​that would address the remaining people indigenous to Algeria, ​les Musulmans             
d’Algérie​. Without obliging them to renounce their Muslim ​statut personnel​, the decree intended             
to grant about 20,000 privileged Algerian Muslim officers, professors, and landowners, the            36
French citizenship in an attempt to reinstate a forgotten balance. Sadly, the proposal never made               
it to the Chamber of Deputies as the ​Pieds Noirs ​immediately opposed and manifested against it.  
Shortly thereafter, although ill-prepared for the abrupt end of their seventy year long             
assimilation, the ​Juifs d’Algérie ​returned to their indigenous status. Ironically, France’s           
protection of the Juifs d’Algérie ceased when Algeria itself was declared a ​protectorat ​rather              
than a ​département ​during World War II, when Jews all around the world were no longer                
considered a ​protectorate nor a geographical extension of the French homeland, but merely as              
an indigenous abomination, unworthy of European protection, to say nothing of European            
nationality. To ensure the legality of the hate wave to come, the ​Loi Marchandeau​, which a year                 
before, had condemned the incitation of hatred brought about by racism or religion, was              
abrogated on April 27th, 1940. On October 3rd, the Vichy regime, founded by Marshal Philippe               
Pétain, inflicted a ​statut de fonction publique ​on the the ​Juifs d’Algérie ​in preparation for the                
Crémieux Decree’s abrogation on October 7th. This status, renamed as ​statut des Juifs d’Algérie              
36 ​Michael Goebel, ​Anti-Imperial Metropolis: Interwar Paris and the Seeds of Third World Nationalism​. (Cambridge 
University Press, 2017), 172. 
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 on November 20th, 1940, was composed of eight severely marginalizing articles. Deprived of             
their French nationality and no longer protected from anti-semitism, the ​Juifs d’Algérie ​were             
targeted by journals such as ​Le Petit Oranais​, which violently propagated: “il faut mettre le               
soufre, la poix, et s’il se peut le feu de l’enfer aux synagogues et aux écoles juives, détruire les                   
maisons de Juifs, s’emparer de leurs capitaux et les chasser…” In sum, the marginalizing              37
anti-semitic discriminations in Europe were not steadily encroaching upon the Jewish subjects in             
the colonies. 
On December 15th, 1941, under Vichy authority, the Office for Economic Aryanization            
was created with the goal to eliminate all Jewish influence on the Algerian economy. As a result,                 
a prominent majority of ​Juifs d’Algérie ​was dismissed from esteemed professions and            
successfully expelled from the economic sphere. Shortly thereafter, Jewish students were           
expelled from universities and public schools even though they composed over 37% of medical              
students, 24% of law students, 16% of science students, and 10% of arts students. By 1942,                
19,484 students were officially excluded from public schools, and by the end of the year only 70                 
primary schools and six middle schools were operational. The exclusion from school made             38
Jacques Derrida reflect in 1999 on the traumatizing experience: “je me demande si je ne voyage                
pas tant parce que j’ai toujours été, comme de l’école, renvoyé.” The ​Juifs d’Algérie ​were thus                39
excluded from the inalienable protection of a homeland that haunted their collective identity for              
generations to come.  
In June of 1940, certain Jewish combattants were directed from the metropole to camps              
in North Africa. Joined by French Jewish political prisoners, approximately 2,000 ​Juifs            
37 Stora, ​C’était Hier en Algérie​, 140. 
38 Ibid., 144. 
39 Ibid., 145. 
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 d’Algérie​, relegated to the condition of ​prestataires étrangers and were interned in Bedeau, in              
the south of Algeria, and Djelfa as well as in other labor and concentration camps across the                 
country. Divided into two distinct groups, “foreign workers” and ​internés​, that is, political             
prisoners, the latter group ​worked for ten hours a day, while they were poorly fed, housed in                 
terrible sanitary conditions, sorely tortured, and inflicted with atrocities executed by camp guards             
for the slightest breach of rules. Like their co-religionists in Europe, the ​Juifs en Algérie were                
treated as inhuman and died from beatings, outbreaks of typhus, and from exhaustion and              
hunger. A year later, in August of 1941, the ​Service Spécial pour le règlement de la question                 
juive ​re-applied the ​Juif Indigène ​status to 111,021 ​Juifs d’Algérie ​born after the inauguration of               
the ​Décret Crémieux and to 6,625 of foreign nationality The ​question juive became thus the               40
very symbol of the substantial, invidious national and international crisis that was not even              
nearly approaching its atrocious conclusion.  
The ​Juifs d’Algérie ​responded to these torments by either increasingly turning inward, or,             
perhaps surprisingly, by ardently embracing France as their ​Patrie​, thanking their God and             
homeland that they did not meet the same monstrous fate as their co-religionists in Europe. To                
expand on this paradox that could easily translate as a manifestation of self-denial: rather than               
weakening, the link between the ​Juifs d’Algérie ​and the metropole consolidated itself and the              
French nationality, in the eyes of many of these victims, and realized its utmost potential. They                
proudly proclaimed: “we are French and we state loudly that … there is no power in this world                  
that can affect the deep feeling that unites us to our country, to its culture, to its dead.” They                   41
40 ​Exhibition Catalogue, ​Juifs d’Algérie; Exposition du 28 septembre 2012 au 27 janvier 2013,​ (Paris; Musée d’art 
et d’histoire du Judaïsme et Skira-Flammarion, 2012 - 2013), 16. 
41 ​Sheryl Silver Ochayon, “The Jews of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia.” ​The Jews of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia​, 
www.yadvashem.org/articles/general/the-jews-of-algeria-morocco-and-tunisia.html. 
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 simply assumed that the Germans pressured the French authorities into instituting racist laws,             
and placed the blame on the former rather than on the latter.  
Led by Henri Aboulker, previously mentioned as a consolidator of the ​Judéo-Musulman            
collective identity as it had functioned in the pre-colonial Algeria, as well as by several French                
army officers, 315 ​Juifs d’Algérie ​joined the Algerian underground resistance, making up 80% of              
the resistance as a whole. They helped the American troops in Operation Torch, best known for                42
liberating Algiers on November 8th, 1942, and enthusiastically welcomed and housed them.            
Befriended their liberators, they attentively followed the allied’ forces’ progress, and further            
potential. 
Indeed, explicitly acknowledged by General Dwight D. Eisenhower and President          
Franklin D. Roosevelt, the ​Juifs d’Algérie ​were promised in November 1942 that the laws              
deferring their liberation (e.g., their continued forced presence in the Bedeau camps, even six              
months after Algeria’s liberation) would soon be abolished. Roosevelt sent Jean Monnet,            
considered one of the founding fathers of the European Union, to mitigate François Darlan’s              
anti-semitic positions and legislation. Serving as the deputy leader of the Vichy Regime, Darlan              
was the highest-ranking officer in North Africa at the time. Hence, when the Allies invaded               
Algeria, they gave him control over North African French forces in exchange for his joining their                
side and relinquishing his anti-semitic doctrines. He didn’t get to act on the agreement as two                
months later, on December 24th, 1942, he was assassinated by Fernand Bonnier de la Chapelle, a                
monarchist opposed to the Vichy Regime. It was only in the following summer that all               
anti-Jewish marginalizing laws were abolished. The Crémieux Decree was reinstated and           
42 Exhibition Catalogue, ​Juifs d’Algérie​, 16. 
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 l’Abolition du statut des Juifs ​was signed ​on October 20th, 1943. The ​Juifs d’Algérie ​were once                
again officially under French rule and of French nationality. On November 22nd, the             
rétablissement was signed by General Charles de Gaulle and Henri Giraud, the ​général d’armée              
who, after initially keeping the Vichy regime in place and assigning its authority to Darlan, was                
eventually convinced by Jean Monnet to break from Pétain’s legislation altogether. The            
document was divided into six articles that ushered in a sort of apology for having betrayed an                 
important segment of its abnormally dedicated citizens (“​les ordonnances du commandant en            
chef français, civil et militaire du 14 mars 1943 et du 18 avril 1943 portant abrogation des                 
mesures prises à l’encontre des Juifs, des membres des associations secrètes ainsi que des              
magistrats, des fonctionnaires civils et militaires, des employés et agents des services concédés             
ou des entreprises subventionnées, relevés de leur fonctions.​” ).  43
It is important to keep in mind that and how the timing of Algeria’s colonization, the                
World Wars, Algeria’s independence, and the subsequent exiles all influenced the ​Juifs            
d’Algérie​’s national consciousness, first as adherents of an imperial France and then of an              
independent Algeria. Following their displacements, the ancestors and older relatives of those            
“faithful children of Crémieux” born into French Algeria, felt Algeria to be a ​paradis perdu, ​a                
lost Paradise. Benjamin Stora recounts that before 1954, “les gens de là-bas se vivaient et se                44
pensaient destinés à vivre sur place pour l’éternité. Ils n’imaginaient pas qu’il faudrait partir.”              45
And yet, the younger relatives who did not define themselves as anti-colonialist or Algerian felt               
that Algeria was in fact France, without  regard to its geographical borders on a world map.  
43 Stora, ​C’était hier en Algérie​, 185. 
44 ​Mickäel Gamrasni, personal interview, January 20, 2018.  
45 Stora, ​C’était hier en Algérie​, 149. 
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 Hence the time during which one was born in the land of Algeria effectively determined               
one’s assumption of identity as a function of the homeland. Whether of ​Judéo-Arabe heritage, or               
primarily French and only then Jewish (and possibly Algerian), the eventual displacements of the              
Jewish Algerian would either obstruct or reinforce the above identifications and conceptions.            
With names like Derrida, Cixous, and Stora, Jews had lived in North Africa for over 2,000 years.                 
Some had arrived with the Phoenicians between 1100 and 146 BCE, others had sought refuge               
after their expulsion, along with the Muslim population, following the fall of Granada, the last               
bastion of Islamic Spain, an exile that was completed with the Reconquista in 1492. Put               
differently, the ​Juifs d’Algérie had a complex mosaic of Judeo-Berber, Judeo-Arab, Portuguese            
and Sephardic roots, in which each locality had its own customs and thereby challenged the               
definitions of homeland and heritage in comparison to actual place of birth and nationality. 
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 Les Juifs d’Algérie ​during ​la Guerre d’Algérie 
 
When the ​guerre sans nom​, La Guerre d’Algérie​, began in 1954, the Westernized             
generations of ​Juifs d’Algérie guided their older “Oriental,” rather devastated, relatives away            
from the homeland and on the way to the construction of yet another. Unlike the ​Pieds Noirs,                 
several were advocates of an independent Algeria on which their ancestors planted their family              
tree. However, like the ​Pieds Noirs​, they felt they had the right to claim Algeria as their own,                  
their home, whether it be French or independent. From 1954 to 1962, the ​Juifs d’Algérie ​faced                
some of the most difficult choices and challenges the Jewish people had endured throughout their               
varied history. Called to stand with two opposing sides, the verdict of the ​Juifs d’Algérie ​on                
Algerian soil was that of unrequited potential and inevitable displacement. Numbering 130,000,            
as opposed to nine million Arab-Berber Algerians and about one million European settlers, the              
Jewish Algerian minority was faced with three choices: accept and strive for independence, join              
the battle in defense of colonial Algeria, or leave.  
The quest for Algeria’s independence gained momentum after French promises for           
Algerian self-rule went unfulfilled following the conclusion of World War II. Both Algerian and              
French organizations revealed the extreme measures (and violence) they were capable of when it              
came to maintaining what they thought was ‘rightfully’ theirs to claim. The FLN, ​Front de               
Libération Nationale​, began its guerilla activities in the countryside, particularly along Algeria’s            
borders. Targeting France as an oppressive colonial force, this nationalist Algerian organization            
sought diplomatic recognition from the United Nations so that it could establish a sovereign              
Algerian state. Their most violent activities took place in and around Algiers from 1956 to 1957,                
during which its members launched a series of violent urban attacks, bombed bars and cafés in                
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 Algeria’s European quarters (such as the Milk Bar) and participated in what came to be known as                 
la Bataille d’Alger. ​The battle was concluded with an increased presence of French forces              
(500,000 to be exact) ready to do whatever it took to regain control, even if it meant systematic                  46
torture and rape. Despite the terror, the vehement opposition, and an attempted coup by the               
French army, the Evian Accords, signed in 1962, declared Algeria independent from foreign rule              
for the first time in its existence.  
The several difficult choices Algeria’s War of Independence forced the ​Juifs d’Algérie ​to             
make serve as the basis for our analysis of identity and homeland in the remaining chapters to                 
come. Torn by the choice to either advocate for their forefathers’ homeland and ​berbère ​heritage,               
or preserve a French Algeria that embedded them in culture and ideals they could identify with,                
the ​Juifs d’Algérie ​were inevitably caught in the middle of this conflict’s spectrum. Since the               
French conquest of Algeria, the ​Juifs d’Algérie had kept their official affiliation with either              
“camp” to a certain minimum. The War put an end to the ​Juifs d’Algérie’​s almost normalized                
and internalized task of mediating between their two opposing collective identities, French and             
Algerian, and required them to indefinitely choose one over the other. As negotiations for a               
resolution became evidently impossible, each choice would cause a particular controversy. That            
is to say, although the Jewish Algerian collective identity had sought refuge in silence and, as it                 
were, remained apolitical, individuals within it associated themselves with either the French or             
with the Algerians, each of which camp envisioned a very different conclusion to the war and                
thus a future fate for Algeria as a homeland. The choice to be either displaced or remain in a                   
46 ​Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia. “Algerian War.” ​Encyclopædia Britannica​, Encyclopædia 
Britannica, Inc., 4 Jan. 2016, www.britannica.com/event/Algerian-War. 
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 home that gradually turned hostile would, in the years and decennia to come, both mutate and                
reaffirm Algeria’s several collective identities.  
Despite the Jewish Algerian tendency to restrain associations to a personal level, Élie             
Gozlan, a prominent Algerian Jew born in 1876, a former instructor of Arabic and director of the                 
Bulletin de la Fédération des Sociétés Juives d’Algérie ​(the main Jewish Algerian communal             
journal), divided the ​Juifs d’Algérie ​during the Algerian Civil War into four detailed categories: 
1. “Ceux qui n’ont rien appris mais tout oublié et entendent demeurer français ‘avant tout’;              
ils n’ont paru nulle part pendant la tempête et comprennent des étrangers au judaïsme              
algérien” ;  
2. “Ceux qui ont souffert dans leur chair, dans leur âme et dans leur sang de l’antisémitisme                
et de sa farouche hypocrisie et ne veulent plus aucune attache avec les représentants de               
cet antisémitisme qui exercent encore toute l’autorité, mais demeurent des Français” ; 
3. “Ceux qui veulent profiter de la situation historique qu’offre l’appui de l’Amérique et de              
l’Angleterre et veulent cesser d’être des parias et refaire leur patrie : la patrie juive” ;  
4. “Ceux qui se déclarent être ici des autochtones et qui considèrent que l’Algérie est leur               
terre comme elle est celle des Arabes, qu’ils ont vécu avec ces derniers sans qu’une               
hypocrite civilisation [française] à laquelle ils ont tout donné, les ait abrités.”  47
 
Although it is hard to categorize the complex mosaic of Algeria’s internally divided Jewish              
community, Gozlan’s distinctions are nonetheless informative. For instance, the majority of           
notable ​Juifs d’Algérie​, who essentially became ‘notable’ due to their economic and national             
attachment to the ​Patrie​, were the ones who, even after Vichy, viewed France as an entity of                 
essential ‘goodness’. Among the six interviews independently conducted for this project, two            
interviewees, Henri Atlan and Denis Guénoun, the first based in Israel and the second in Paris,                
appear to partly belong to Gozlan’s first category. Although defining themselves as post-zionist             
and post-communist, respectively, the two inhabit a deep sense of belonging to France, to the               
French language and  identity, and think of nationality and homeland as essentially synonymous.  
47 ​Pierre-Jean Le Foll Luciani, «Les juifs d’Algérie face aux nationalités française et algérienne (1940-1963) , ​Revue 
des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée​  (26 juin 2015), accessed March 12, 2018, 
http://journals.openedition.org/remmm/9057.  
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 In the interviews’ early stages, both almost immediately referred to their fathers, creating             
a Father-Son theme that would interestingly persist throughout the other interviews. While            
Guénoun’s father was a ​Semite ​(‘a Jewish Arab’, after whom he titled his memoir of Algeria,                
entitled ​Un sémite​), and a communist in favor of Algeria’s independence, both he and Atlan’s               
father appreciated the French culture and felt ‘more’ French than Jewish or Algerian, thus              
inevitably influencing their sons’ definitions and later appreciations of identity and homeland:  
“Moi j’ai pas demandé la citoyenneté française, et mon père non plus, mais mon père               
était très content d’avoir la citoyenne française, et d’élever ses enfants dans la France… 
Pour lui y avait que de la France, en plus il a fait la guerre de 14, c'était un ancien                    
combattant en France, il y avait que de la France … ils habitaient en Algérie avant que les                  
arabes l’ont conquise” “Moi je n’ai connu que  l'Algérie  comme département français.”   48
 
“Mon père se sentait beaucoup plus français qu’algérien, il se sentait radicalement            
français. Il était très conscient de ses origines algériennes. Mes grands parents parlaient             
arabe très très bien et bien le francais, mon père parlait le français beaucoup plus que                
l’arabe, et moi je parle seulement le français … Mais il pensait que l’Algérie devait être                
le pays des Algériens. Il était contre la colonisation. Donc, il était au parti communiste.”   49
 
In an attempt to understand in what way living on Algerian soil did or did not influence their                  
perception of France, these interviewees made it extremely clear that from 1870 until 1962,              
regardless of geographical boundaries, for them Algeria ​was ​France: “Nous n’avions pas le             
sentiment de faire partie des colonies, d’appartenir à l’empire colonial français, nous ​étions ​la              
France.”   50
This absoluteness, that could potentially translate into a disregard and ignorance, could            
also be explained by France’s implantation of facilities and organizations that brought about the              
distinct separation between the French citizens and indigenous Algerians, sustained by little to no              
interaction, rendering one invisible, or rather non existent to the other (as often happens in an                
48 ​Henri Atlan, personal interview, January 8, 2018. 
49 Denis Guénoun, personal interview, January 19, 2018. 
50 ​Stora, ​Les clés retrouvées​, 62. 
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 “imagined community”); Mohammed Dib provides his account of his relationship as an            
indigenous Algerian with French Algerians: “Ma mémoire de cette époque reste vierge de tout              
souvenir d’étrangers … mes yeux n’étaient nullement faits pour les voir. Ils n’existaient pas,”              51
Atlan and Guénoun, who feel more French than Jewish or Algerian, provide us with that of the                 
‘Europeans’:  
“Pour moi quand j’étais enfant les Arabes ça faisait partie du paysage. C’était comme des               
animaux, comme des chèvres, la question se pose même pas, on avait aucun rapport avec               
eux, au lycée on n'avait que des étudiants français, on avait des écoles moins              
prestigieuses où on avait des Arabes, qui sont devenus le cadre de la révolution … la                
plupart des cadres du FLN faisait des études supérieures.”   52
 
“J’avais pas d'amis arabe. Pas du tout. La rupture était terrible entre nous. Je crois que le                 
personnage arabe que j’ai connu le mieux c'était la femme qui venait faire le ménage chez                
nous.”   53
 
Extremely dedicated to an adoptive France that had given them their language, culture, identity,              
and horizons, both interviewees foreshadow the crucial role of nationality to which we will              
return later. Both believe that nationality dictates one’s identity and homeland, crediting their             
French passport for the often complex and conflicted definitions this thesis seeks to analyze.  
One should nevertheless keep in mind the possibility that this seemingly nationalistic            
approach, so clearly assumed by several ​Juifs d’Algérie​, was not necessarily one of blind faith.               
Having been both indigenous and French, the ​Juifs d’Algérie ​were painfully aware of the              
superiority the French collective identity held over the Algerian. They relied on the two              
collective identities to propotionalize and use French sovereignty to alleviate the Algerian            
identity’s collective marginalization. Accordingly, Henri Aboulker, like many other ​Juifs          
d’Algérie​, thought of the reestablishment of the French nationality (after its abrogation by the              
51 ​Mohammed Dib, ​Une enfance algérienne​, textes recueillis par Leïla Sebbar, (Paris: Gallimard 1997), 109.  
52 ​Henri Atlan, personal interview, January 8, 2018. 
53 ​Denis Guénoun, personal interview, January 19, 2018. 
42 
 Vichy Regime) as an unconditional prerequisite that would force one to side with one or the                
other pole of one’s dual identity. He believed the Jewish Algerian community ​would be most               
competent in helping its Muslim cohabitants when belonging to the French nationality rather             
than by associating with the indigenous Algerian identity. Even after witnessing an anti-semitic             
France, the French nationality was seen by some as more resourceful than the never officially               
established ​Judéo-Musulman​ consortium of almost friends and never quite accomplices.  
The ​Judéo-Musulman ​relations that did ‘officially’ develop date back to 1936 and were             
established by Arabic speaking Jewish Algerian notables born between 1870 and 1910. ​Members             
of ​Judéo-Musulman ​projects and movements, such as ​l’Association des Oulémas​, la Fédération            
des Élus, ​and the ​Parti du Peuple Algérien ​(PPA), blatantly attacked the idea of colonialism and                
strove for equality between the two communities. Prominent members of the Jewish Algerian             
community such as Henri Aboulker, Elie Gozlan, Marcel Loufrani, Andre Narboni, and Marcel             
Belaiche ​demanded that the two communities would get equal salary, have the same nationality,              
and insisted on the abolition of a judiciary system designed for the indigenous. ​Together,              
inspired by the French ideals on Algerian soil, they defended a ​fraternité Judéo-Musulmane and              
used the very ​décret ​that had forever changed their standing in Algeria to prove that it was                 
possible, and profitable, to assimilate the remaining indigenous into the French nationality.            
These Jewish Algerian individuals, assumed the pre-1870 role of their metropolitan French            
coreligionists and took the responsibility for the assimilation of their cohabitants’ (rather than             
coreligionists), while the indigenous Algerians reminded the first of what the ​Juifs d’Algérie             
were before the French intervention in Algeria. Balanced between Gozlan’s fourth and second             
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 categories, the ​Judéo-Musulman ​relations allude to the uncanny repetition of alliances, battles,            
and categorizations particular to French Algeria throughout its long history. 
To unite an evolving fraternity against another that had been embedded for 70 years,              
Muslim Algerian notables, such as the lawyer Ahmed Boumendjel, addressed the persisting            
absence of the ​Juifs d’Algérie​’s French nationality on behalf of the ​Parti du Peuple Algérien               
(PPA)​: “les musulmans ... ont pu simplement se rendre compte qu’une citoyenneté qu’on retirait              
après 70 ans d’existence était ‘discutable’ par la faute de ceux-là même qui l’avaient octroyée.”               54
The alliance with the ​Juifs d’Algérie​, respected by the French for their military service and their                
strong Jewish electorate, became a source of subversion for Algeria’s colonized society. When             
the ​Manifeste du Peuple Algérien ​was published in February of 1943, a nationalistic Algeria              
transformed into an anti-colonialist nation that demanded ​auto-détermination​. ​Supported by          
many “assimilationists” born during the ​entre deux guerres ​time period, collective negotiations            
for an independent Algeria could last up to seven hours and often called for the reciprocation of                 
each other’s privileges (whether they be economic, social, or national).  
Yet despite this evolving symbiosis, the ​Juifs d’Algérie​’s ‘by birth’ held and expressed a              
certain grudge among several Muslim Algerians, driven by a remaining sense of inferiority.             
Another member of the ​Parti du Peuple Algérien ​and author of the Algerian national anthem,               
Moufdi Zakaria, reminded the Muslim Algerians of the “countless Jewish betrayals” carried out             
both in Algeria and in the rest of the world. To prove that their collective identity was as                  
Algerian as it was Jewish, Marcel Loufrani and Gozlan declared themselves ​Indigènes Algériens             
and affirmed that “nous n’accepterons jamais quoi que ce soit sans que le musulman n’y soit                
54 ​Luciani, “Les juifs d’Algérie,” ​Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée ​137 (mai 2015). 
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 associé.” Emmanuel Sivan, a professor of Islamic History at the Hebrew University of             55
Jerusalem, asserts that the Europeans and Jews who adhered to the ​Parti Communiste             
Algérienne​, PCA (the most prominent anti-colonialist movement in Algeria following its           
dissociation with the French Communist Party in 1936) did so for the sake of anti-fascism, rather                
than for the Muslim Algerians, and were still “plein de préjugés en ce qui [concerne] les                
musulmans et méfiants devant le danger du ‘nationalisme indigène.’” Nevertheless, the PCA            56
was joined by 12,000 individuals, of whom half were non-Muslim ​patriotes algériens who             
envisioned an Algeria composed of ​Algériens musulmans, Algériens d’origine européenne​, and           
French (if they so wished) who for the first time in Algeria’s history would be legally considered                 
as ​étrangers​ and, more pertinently, as independent from colonizers.  
Given their unfamiliarity with what an Algerian nationalist government might be capable            
of, the participation of the ​Juifs d’Algérie​’s in the party, especially that of the younger               
generation, needs some explanation. Sivan credits this engagement to this group’s visceral            
reaction to the racisms practiced in World War II. In other words, they joined the anti-colonial                
struggle due to an individual motivation rather than an overarching idealistic cause they             
adopted, reacting against the racists and fascists, rather than against racism or fascism, as              
prejudicial and ideological worldviews in the abstract.  
Although they were often addressed in communist propaganda as ​Algériens d’origine           
Israélite ​or ​Juive​, the PCA did not specifically allow the ​Juifs d’Algérie a place in any public                 
discourse concerning an Independent Algerian Nation until 1954, when they had no choice but to               
absolutely side with one of their collective identities. When the ​Guerre d’Algérie ​began,             
55 ​Ibid. 
56 Ibid.  
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 propaganda carried out by both the the FLN, and by anti-colonialist, liberal, or communist Jews,               
called for the ​Juifs d’Algérie​’s final collective association in the conflict. The FLN’s propaganda              
deemed the ​Décret Crémieux ​an operation of division and denationalisation, and like            
Boumendjel, reminded Algerian Jews of how the laws inaugurated by Vichy’s France and             
European anti-semitism demonstrated that the “citoyenneté française est artificielle.”  
The ​appel du FLN aux Juifs d’Algérie​, initiated by Jewish militants driven by the motto:               
“La France peut vite reprendre d’une main ce qu’elle donne de l’autre,” pressed the Jewish               57
Algerian collective to proclaim its decision on the Algerian nationality. The ‘call’ was concluded              
with the idea of homeland: “C’est parce que le FLN considère les israélites algériens comme les                
fils de notre patrie qu’il espère que les dirigeants de la communauté juive auront la sagesse de                 
contribuer à l’édification d’une Algérie libre et véritablement fraternelle.” Still on the topic of              58
homeland, the response however, of several ​Juifs d’Algérie was: “vous nous demandez de trahir              
une patrie dont nous sommes citoyens, la France, pour une patrie qui n’existe pas encore,”               59
emphasizing that Algeria, as its own independent governing body, did not exist just yet. They               
began to fear that, as the ​Organization Armée Sécrete (OAS) speculated, the independent             
Algerian nationality would, ironically, be like the French citizenship dictated by the Crémieux             
Decree, that is, imposed rather than offered and merited. Fearful of an independent Algeria as a                
whole, the CJAES used the case of Morocco as a cautionary tale, reminding that “souvent,               
lorsqu’un État arabe accède à l’indépendance… les Juifs de ce pays en subissent les              
57 ​Stora, ​Les clés retrouvées​, 76. 
58 Ibid., 87. 
59 Ibid., 89. 
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 conséquences.” This apocalyptic vision of an independent Algeria played a major role in the              60
massive departures of the ​Juifs d’Algérie​ from Algeria to notably France. 
Further fueling such such fears and subsequent mindset, the ​Organisation Armée Secrète            
or OAS, the French political and military clandestine organization created on February 11th,             
1961, made it its mission to resolutely reject an independent Algeria to preserve French Algeria,               
regardless the consequences and even if this entailed extreme violence. Such violence was             
deliberately directed at both nationalist Algerians, Communist ​Pieds Noirs​, Juifs d’Algérie ​and            
anyone who stood in the way fo a French Algeria. Along the FLN, the OAS terrorized both                 
Algeria and France to a substantial extent. From March 16th, it marked Algeria’s buildings with               
slogans such as these: “l’Algérie est française et le restera,” “OAS vaincra,” “l’OAS frappe où               
elle veut et quand elle veut.”   61
By the same token, starting in January of 1962, the FLN targeted Jewish neighborhoods              
such as Mostaganem, in northwest Algeria. For instance, an attack against the Jews of Nédromah               
resulted in the death of seven ​Juifs d’Algérie​, three of whom were children. In March, the great                 
Rabbi of Médéa was killed in front of his synagogue. In May, an attack in La Chronique d’Alger,                  
a casino where many European and Jewish youngsters convened, killed several dozens. While             
both individual ​Juifs Pieds Noirs and other collectives in Algiers and Oran fully engaged with               
the OAS. These groups supported what came to be known as the ​France Résurrection​, managed               
by Elie Azoulai and Ben Attar. To secure this resurrection they resorted to extreme measures,               
assassinated elected Muslims, and attempted to set a prison, where several members of the FLN               
were detained, on fire.  
60  Luciani, “Les juifs d’Algérie” ​Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée ​137 (mai 2015). 
61 ​“Organisation De l' Armée Secrète (OAS).” ​La Guerre D'Algérie​, 26 Jan. 2015, accessed April 29, 2018, 
laguerredalgerie.canalblog.com/archives/2015/01/26/31406267.html.  
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 Recognizing the need for mediating positions in a conflict of extremes, the ​Comité des              
Juifs Libéraux (CJL) established itself in Algiers in 1956 and gathered a few dozen ​Juifs               
d’Algérie ​of nuanced opinions united by the common goal of attaining a double citizenship in a                
potentially independent Algeria that would guarantee their secured presence in their place of             
birth, regardless of its political fate. The double nationality should have provided the different              
generations of the ​Juifs d’Algérie with a sense of confidence. These efforts reached out to the                
younger generations, who identified as French, and to the elderly arabophones, who lived             
amongst the Algerian Muslims and gave their “adhésion au principe de la personnalité             
algérienne.” The latter, envisioned to “composer avec les musulmans dans un état indépendant…             
dans la limite où les juifs conserveront une vie de citoyen libre.”   62
Although the double citizenship would have saved them the various displacements and            
consequently might have preserved their identity as a proper function of the homeland, it also               
became clear that the their eventual displacement was almost inevitable. When the time came,              
the ​Juifs d’Algérie ​who embarked on their itineraries to either France or Israel were left solely                
with the French collective identity, while they were forced to mourn the from here on forbidden                
Algerian land of origin. And so it was that despite the attempts at dialogues offered by both the                  
FLN and the Muslim community, for a majority of the ​Juifs d’Algérie the fear of a potentially                 
independent Algeria overruled the fear from an unpredictable ​Patrie​.  
In March of 1960, President Charles de Gaulle (inaugurated on January 8th, 1959)             
embarked on what came to be known by the media as ​la tournée des popotes​, which roughly                 
translates as the round of mess that was about to be served. During this ​tournée​, de Gaulle visited                  
62 Ibid. 
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 fifteen posts of the French Army in Constantine, Algiers, and Oran, to receive detailed accounts               
of their operations. Searching for a possible alternative to the situation, he inquired with fellow               
officers stationed in these bases and arrived at the conclusion that there were three possible               
actions the Algerians could take to achieve a solution:  
● Secession, whose consequences would be “​une misère épouvantable, un affreux chaos           
politique, un égorgement généralisé et bientôt la dictature belliqueuse des          
communautés​;”  
● Complete Francisation “​de Dunkerque à Tamanrasset​;”  
● The drafting of a constitution that would unique to an Algeria governed by Algerians, but               
nonetheless “​en union étroite avec la France​.”   63
 
Taking all three into consideration yet openly advocating for the first, de Gaulle sought to prove                
that French rule would protect Algerians from the conflict’s accumulating perils. As certain             
young ​Juifs d’Algérie​, specifically in Oran, sided with the, OAS and others with the FLN, the                
conflict’s final stages with its mounting violence proved that the process of assimilation into the               
French culture succeeded in making the ​Juifs d’Algérie ​an inseparable part of an unforgettable,              
even if terrorizing, French Algeria. Despite the conflicting demands for their clear social and              
political stances, the only constant, as so often, remained be found in  their shared Judaism.  
In the course of the twenty years that followed Algeria’s independence, out of the 25,000               
Juifs d’Algérie ​who were initially determined to stay in their homeland, only 200 were left. By                
2005, no Jews were to be found on Algerian soil. While some would choose to immigrate to                 
Canada or the United States, the majority, notably Gozlan’s first and second categories of the               
War’s ​Juifs d’Algérie​, left for France. And while the majority among the Jewish Algerian was               
63 ​“Allocution Du Général De Gaulle Du 16 Septembre 1959 En Faveur De L'autodétermination - Ina.fr.” ​INA - 
Jalons​, 8 Nov. 2016, accessed April 28, 2018, 
fresques.ina.fr/jalons/fiche-media/InaEdu00088/allocution-du-general-de-gaulle-du-16-septembre-1959-en-faveur-d
e-l-autodetermination.html.  
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 thus displaced to France, members of the third category started immigrating to Israel for both               
religious and political reasons, beginning in the early stages of the war and then, increasingly,               
after the Six Days War in 1967. The fourth category included the minority that was originally                
determined to stay in their homeland and place of birth. Hence, by categorizing the ​Juifs               
d’Algérie ​of ​la Guerre d’Algérie​, Gozlan unknowingly foreshadowed the different displacements           
they would face on between 1954 and 1962, and afterwords. Each displacement revealed the              
choices of which identity to assume as a function of the homeland, whether the latter be                
understood in terms of place of birth or as construct formed and fostered abroad.  
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 Les Juifs d’Algérie​ after ​la Guerre 
 
After the signing of the ​Accords d’Évian ​on the 18th of March, 1962, the streets of                
Algeria were filled with ‘​cadres​’ (designated containers made out of wood) for the families of               
the ​rapatriés to place their belongings and souvenirs in. Assigned the ​Pieds Noirs​’s status of               
rapatriés​, the ​Juifs d’Algérie were from here on often confused with the former. Uprooted, 95%               
of them, some of them having never crossed the sea by a boat or the sky with a plane, headed                    
towards France. Merging with all the different social and political categories of groups that were               
likewise exiled from the now independent Algeria, they were dropped off on the Mediterranean’s              
European shore and took a step, for some the very first, on the ​Patrie ​that adopted them 92 years                   
before and that had colonized their place of birth 132 years prior to its independence on July 5th,                  
1962.  
After 1962, the urgency was to integrate into the metropolitan French society, rather than              
to remain in ​l’Orient ​that many of them left indefinitely. The departures of the ​Juifs d’Algérie                
from Algeria accelerated even further due to the murder of Raymond Leyris, prominently known              
as ​Cheikh Raymond​. A renowned ​maitre ​of Arab-Andalusian music, Raymond was well known             
and liked by all groups and ​armées ​involved in the conflict, including both the FLN and the OAS                  
(in the unique image below, retrieved from Jacques Leyris’ home in Paris, we find him               
surrounded by (as indicated, in low definition) standing OAS and  seated FLN members): 
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 In the few weeks that followed ​Chef​’s assassination, various manifestations carried out by the              
FLN in Jewish Algerian neighborhoods brought about last minute departures of both Jewish and              
Christian communities. Raymond’s son, Jacques Leyris, who, when asked of his identity,            
claimed to be “solely French rather than French Algerian,” recounts in our interview the painful               
experience of having lost his father to this extreme violence and the departure that soon               
followed:  
“Mon père a été assassiné le 22 juin, 1962 et moi j’ai pris l'avion le 15 août 1962, avec                   
ma petite soeur, et avec ma tante, j’avais exactement quatorze ans et neuf mois.  
Ça a été une période difficile … [alors un jeune orphelin..] j’avais perdu la chose qui m’a                 
été le plus cher avec ma mère et mes soeurs … Le deuil c’était quelque chose de très                  
strict ... Et là [à Paris] j'ai passé des moments très durs.”  64
 
Although the ​Juifs d’Algérie ​were met, upon their arrival at the port of Marseille, with               
signs that read Welcome in Hebrew (םיאבה םיכורב), with the word Zion centered on the Star of                 
David placed in between the two words, for many the separation from Algeria as a home was                 
experienced as an unjustified traumatic rupture. The displacement exposed them to an            
unforeseen reality of abhorrence and isolation. Due to their sudden massive arrival, a housing              
crisis drove them to the periphery of Paris, notably Sarcelles, Épinay-sur-Seine, Créteil, Orly,             
Gennevilliers, and Orsay. Stora tells that his displaced Jewish Algerian mother would come             65
back from shopping shocked at the fact that there was (or rather was not) “pas une seule tête                  
connue dans la rue​.​” Whether it was for financial reasons or residential restrictions, the              66
gallicized ​Juifs d’Algérie ​were immediately reminded of what it was like to be othered in the                
presence of the Europeans. The souvenirs of the Jewish presence in Algeria were preserved              
64 ​Jacques Leyris, personal interview, January 20, 2018. 
65 Jean Laloum, “Les Bouleversements Communautaires Consécutifs à l’Arrivée des Juifs Nord-Africains en France 
dans les Années 1950”  in ​Juifs d’Algérie; Exposition du 28 septembre 2012 au 27 janvier 2013​, (Paris; Musée d’art 
et d’histoire du Judaïsme et Skira-Flammarion, 2012 - 2013), 239.  
66 Stora, ​C’était hier en Algérie​, 178. 
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 through the culture’s preservation, through the chanting of melodies like ​“j’ai quitté mon pays,              
j’ai quitté ma maison” ​or “​la France de mon enfance, perdue au soleil du côté d’Alger, c’est elle                  
la France où je suis né.​” And these expressions of loss ​contribute to our understanding of how a                  
lost way of life is perpetuated even when the possibility to return to it is gone. We will return to                    
this insight in the conclusion of this investigation. Although some ​Juifs d’Algerie ​missed a world               
composed of open doors and familial and neighborly relations, a world of sounds, odors, savories               
and feelings, the majority of the exiled nonetheless insisted on fully integrating into French              
society and to firmly establishing themselves at the center of what, in many cases, the very                
construction of their ​Patrie​. 
While in Algeria, the French had europeanized the ​Juifs d’Algérie​, in France the ​Juifs              
d’Algérie​, as it were, ​reoriented the French metropolitan Jews toward other origins, resacralizing             
their way of life in turn. The suffered displacement inspired a growing solidarity between ​Le               
Fonds Social Juif Unifié ​(FSJU), ​la Campagne des Chantiers du Consistoire ​established in 1960,              
and the ​Comité juif d’action sociale et de reconstruction ​(COJASOR). Together, they founded             
communal institutions where the ​Juifs d’Algérie ​could find one another and connect with their,              
up until that moment, distant French metropolitan coreligionists. In 1954 Belleville, 60% of the              
students who were being taught the Talmud and Torah were of North African origin. Starting in                67
1961, the art of kosher wine, previously imported from Morocco and Tunisia, was implanted and               
taught in France, and ​boucheries ​began catering to an increasingly kosher population. Due to the               
lack of competent French ​shohatim ​(butchers in Hebrew) and the increased consumption of             
kosher products, the ​Juifs d’Algérie​’s successfully entered the metropolitan workforce​. ​When the            
67 ​ Laloum, “Les Bouleversements Communautaires Consécutifs,” 240.  
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 holiday season came about and an increased sacralized French Judaism called for more religious              
space, the ​Association consistoriale israélite de Paris ​(ACIP) dedicated a synagogue on rue des              
Tournelles to Jews of North African origin. Satisfied to have established themselves in a              
homeland the majority only knew as French Algeria, the 110,000 ​Juifs d’Algérie ​displaced to              
France thoroughly transformed the French Jewish community and social space, thus           
strengthening the indispensable connection of Judaism to a homeland regardless of place of birth.  
The outcome of the cultural and political assimilation of the ​Juifs d’Algérie in French              
Algeria only came to light when there were displaced to the ​Patrie​. French citizens for more than                 
four generations, the ​Juifs d’Algérie ascended in social status and could not imagine falling into               
the status of ​dhimmis ​once again, and seemed to prefered to be “othered” as part of a community                  
seen a free and egalitarian rather than being simply tolerated. This social dimension, perhaps,              
explains why the displacements to France outnumbered those to Israel.  
The concept of “othering” is thoroughly explored by two Algerian born French            
intellectuals of Jewish descent, Hélène Cixous and Jacques Derrida. These influential writers and             
thinkers shared not only a convergence of intellectual curiosity and scholarly projects, inspired             
by French feminism and so-called deconstructionism, respectively, but also a degree of            
communal experience. Both were born in pre-Second World War Algeria and remained in Paris              
after the 1962 expulsion. They made intertextual sense of their shared identification to a              
monolingual identity, a characteristic that inspired Derrida’s 1996 autobiographical text ​Le           
Monolinguisme de l’autre​, and Cixous’s literary invocation of the Algerian-born French           
“Stranjew Body.” The experiences of having been born into a colonial hierarchy of ethnicities              
and religions are the sediment that inspires their historical understanding of and public empathy              
54 
 for the fate of Algerians conditioned by a colonial system’s categories. Belonging to             
combinations of Gozlan’s first and second categories, Cixous and Derrida in their respective             
writings arrived at interesting conclusions about the ideals of French Republican universalism,            
colonialism, faith, and the othered identity complex.  
Born to a German Jewish mother and a ​Bèrbere father, Cixous is painfully aware that it is                 
through the experience of anti-semitism that she was able to give form to her Algerianness.               
Having experienced both an institutional expulsion from French public school under Vichy law,             
and a social one when referred to as ​sale juive ​(dirty Jew) outside of school, her identity,                 
displacement, and homelands have left an indelible trace on her vision of the world. The latter is                 
characterized by a position too nuanced for the politics of the post-colonial and is sustained by a                 
progressive disconnect from both the Marxist left and Zionist liberalism. The ambiguity of             
Cixous’s thinking springs from the unique structural historical and cultural tensions of Algerian             
Jewish existence defined by its pull and push toward and against ‘Arab’ indigenousness.   68
Although 1962 marked the end of her immediate contact with Algerian nationalism,            
Cixous reflects on her displacement as she compares the homeland’s metropolitan capital to the              
‘Islamic world’ she was born into: “tout le solide, le brillant, le sanglant, l’éclatant, le respirant,                
le charnel était à Alger, à Paris je flottais dans l’état gazeux, je trainais dans la poussière, je ne                   
respirais pas.” Due to the ambiguity of Cixous’s nascent political consciousness, she was stuck              69
between the legal system that claimed her and the language which defined her, on the one hand,                 
and her sense of belonging to Algeria, on the other: “I was behind the bars of a demented                  
destiny, parked with the French who dis-resemble me, my adversaries, their hands reaching for              
68 ​Judith Butler “Preface”​ ​in Denis Guénoun​, Semite: a Memoir of Algeria​ (New York City, NY: Columbia 
University Press, 2015), x. 
69 ​Hélène Cixous and Pierre Alechinsky, ​Si Près ​(Paris: Galilée, 2007), 12. 
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 mine and, on the other side, invisible hands reaching for my own tribe who had not eyes for me.                   
For them assuredly I was what I was not: a French girl.” Being imprisoned outside the future                 70
Algerian national community to which Cixous ached to belong, her outstretched hand could not              
be received. 
Although Cixous often describes her struggle of not finding her place in Algeria, she              
perceives terms such as ​judaitiés ​or ​Algériance ​not as operating in separate spheres but rather as                
functioning together to form a reconstructed whole. She formulated ​The Algerian-Thing​, made            
up of many hitherto suppressed memories of an Algeria resurfaced contemporaneously due to a              
period of intense Algerian civil unrest in the 1990s, during which opposition to the regime and                
Islamist violence and brutality by members of the Algerian civil society reverberated throughout             
France. Her article, ​Mon Algériance​, published in 1997, engaged more directly than usual with              
her fears about the reification of identity and her consternation at the ongoing process of French                
community-making. In Cixous’s words “I fear the way in which people through anxiety and              
inspired by unhappiness take on, belong, attach themselves,” which “includes writers who plot             
their land, become lord or a manor, search for houses, patrons and identity.” In 1998, she wrote                 71
from the point of view of an Algerian, discussing feelings of ‘not being French’ and showed a                 
degree of unity between the historical positioning of Algerians and their progenies in France.              
Cixous’s politics of the self are thus distinct from the overwhelming majority that often gives               
credence to the innate fundamentals of Jewish (Algerian or French) identity, origin, faith, politics              
or community. For Cixous, Algeria is not an adherence to tribalism, but an association, both in                
its religious and indigenous forms. Due to their identification with Jewish French Algerians in              
70 ​Hélène Cixous and Eric Prenowitz, "Letter to Zohra Drif," The Johns Hopkins University Press, (winter 2003), 87. 
71 ​Hélène Cixous, ​Mon Algériance​, (1997b) 70–74. 
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 their displacement from a home composed of rituals and sentiments, and their association with a               
homeland of ideals and culture, both Cixous and Derrida separate themselves as individuals from              
the political mainstream and its approach to France’s or Algeria’s national identity and sense of               
belonging.  
A Sephardic Jew whose ancestors have lived in Algeria long before the French colonial              
expansion in 1830, Jacques Derrida’s ethnic and sociohistorical background makes his           
self-presentation as a French Algerian ‘liberal’ understandable: “To be liberal was to hold the              
French government up to the standards of its republican tradition… the tension between             
belonging to France and the critique of French colonialism was constitutive of the liberal              
political stance.” The liberals were united by their resistance to a colonial system that placed               72
severe restrictions on the individual rights of French colonial subjects. Neither a colonial subject              
nor a fervent anti-colonial campaigner, Derrida defined himself as a respectful liberal adherent of              
Algerian politics, despite his avowedly identification with the French.  
Derrida’s history explains why, on reading the book ​Les Français d’Algérie ​by Pierre             
Nora, a friend from his days at the Lycée Louis-le-Grand, he felt a close affinity with those                 
accused in Nora’s ‘political intervention’ rather than purely ‘academic study.’ In Nora’s            
estimation, the liberals were incapable of supporting Algerian independence because they           
believed Algeria owed everything to France, especially liberalism. By contrast, Nora refused to             
see French Algerian liberalism as properly French and rather regarded its Algerian born citizens              
as complicit in the upholding of colonial authority. In Nora’s eyes, the ​Français d’Algérie​’s              
prolonged stay in Algeria eroded their European characteristics, making their claims to            
72 ​Edward Baring, ​Liberalism and the Algerian War: the Case of Jacques Derrida​, (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 2010), 250. 
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 Frenchness ring hollow. Thus, he dedicated the first chapter of his book to this refutation of an                 
identity. In so doing, he mocked the very accent Derrida was evidently embarrassed by, by               
imitating it through sentences such as these “je suis froncé, moi, Monsieur, je suis aussi froncé                
que vous!” Nora’s generalizations and refusal to differentiate among the ​Français d’Algérie            73
must have felt to Derrida like a personal attack.  
Driven by a concerted and meticulous effort to distinguish the French Algerian liberals             
from the die-hard supporters of colonialism, Derrida addressed Nora in a private letter composed              
on April 27th, 1961. Outlining a position that was as distrustful of the French army as it was of                   74
the Algerian nationalist forces, the letter suggested that these dichotomies were neither rigid nor              
in simple opposition to each other. That is, even though French Algerian liberals worried that               
independence would cause their miserable mass exodus, they were pessimistic about the future             
of a government directed by the FLN that would not allow a plurality of political and religious                 
beliefs. In defending the French Algerian liberals, Derrida de facto defended himself, concluding             
on a pacifist note, speaking of their mutual “désaccord … qui n’est jamais pour nous qu’une                
façon d’être d’accord ensemble. Ou de ne pas être d’accord avec soi. Et comment penser               
sérieusement à l'Algérie - ou à autre chose - sans en venir là?” In other words, Derrida                 75
accentuates that in order to accurately criticize the French Algerians, one must have been              
identified with French Algeria’s homeland. 
Torn between a colonial power towards which he felt grave misgivings and a French              
republican tradition to which he expressed a strong allegiance, Derrida was confronted with             
73 Ibid., 250. 
74 Ibid., 240. 
75 Ibid., 261. 
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 questions as to the univocity of identity and the structural limitations of critique, both of them                
themes that would preoccupy him in his more theoretical writings: 
“​La folie comme exclusion de l’autre hors de l’opération de rationalisation, la            
structuration en intérieur-extérieur, le même et l’autre, la relation éthique à l’Autre,            
l’altérité, la différence, les différences identitaires, l’identité qui se distingue          
d’elle-même, la translation, le déplacement, l’emprise déstabilisante sur le marginal, le           
subalterne subversif, la dépendance constitutive du centre à l’égard du marginal ou de             
l’exclu, la dissémination, la diaspora conçue sans le point final du retour et enfin, avant               
tout, l’histoire comme violence, comme violence ontologique, éthique et conceptuelle.”  76
 
Derrida first developed his deconstructive ideas from the tortured political stance of a Jewish              
French Algerian liberal, indeed, his practice of textual deconstruction became itself a procedure             
of intellectual and cultural decolonisation, revealing and mobilizing the foundations of the text             
to be those of contradicting polarity. Neither dedicated to the French sovereignty, nor to the               
cause of Algerian nationalism per se, Derrida, among the majority of the ​Juifs d’Algérie​,              
remained silent on the question of Algeria for most of his life. The silence, was not due to his                   
lack of interest, but rather a response to the complexities of the situation that brought him to hold                  
passionate and nuanced political beliefs. Refusing to fall into binary oppositions, for or against,              
Derrida has always been hard to place on a political spectrum. Although he refused both political                
positions and the entire system of political logic, he was, however, not apolitical. In the first draft                 
of his seminal text defining deconstruction, the possibility of a ‘revolution’ from within or ‘in the                
language of a department of internal affairs’ ‘disturbance’ was framed in terms directly and              
indirectly related to the idioms surrounding the Algerian war.  
As had been the case with Cixous, it was only in the 1990s that Derrida’s opinion on                 
Algeria was explicit enough to share with the public. Instead of defining himself as a French                
76 ​Robert J.C. Young, “Subjectivité et Histoire: Derrida en Algérie,” ​Cairn. Info ​(2009), ​accessed March 3rd, 2018                 
doi:​10.3917/litt.154.0135. 
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 Algerian, “a black and very Arab Jew,” he described himself as Franco-Maghrebian, meaning             77
“a French citizen who by birth was North African, and an Algerian in France.” The term aptly                 78
alluded to the relationship between place of birth and homeland. By drawing on the ambiguities               
of his Sephardic Jewish heritage, Derrida argued that he was “une sorte d’enfant de la marge de                 
l’Europe, un enfant de la Méditerranée, qui n’était ni simplement français ni simplement             
africain,” thus implicitly separating himself from the colonists, some of whom he had             79
vociferously defended forty years earlier.  
With traces of older theoretical stances, in ​Le monolinguisme de l’autre​, Derrida used his              
identification as a Franco-Maghrebian to explain his relationship to the French language. He was              
born in a French context and knew no other language apart from French, which was what he                 
called an ‘absolute habitat,’ defining his very relationship to the world. With French as the               
language of the colonizer, disciplined by its usage in Paris and not fully mastered by the                
Sephardic Jew, he accentuated that his own idiom exemplified a more common relationship to              
language as a whole: “Language is for all of us, the ground of our autonomy, the material of our                   
thought and our analyses, but it is one that we can never fully control.” Having only one                 80
language to associate with his three collective identities, he defined the way he was deprived               
from the rest throughout his life as an Algerian born French Jew: 
“La communauté à laquelle j’appartenais aura été trois fois dissociée: elle fut coupée,             
d’abord, et de la langue et de la culture arabe et berbère, plus proprement maghrébines,               
elle fut coupée aussi et de la langue et de la culture française, voire européennes, qui                
étaient pour elle un pôle éloigné, hétérogène à son histoire: elle fut coupée enfin, ou pour                
77 Baring, ​Liberalism and the Algerian War​, (The University of Chicago Press, 2010), 259. 
78 Jacques Derrida, ​Le monolinguisme de l’autre​, (Stanford, Calif., 1998), 29–30.  
79 ​Jacques Derrida, Mustapha Chérif, ​Islam and the West: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida​ (University of 
Chicago Press, 2008), ​56. 
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 commencer, de la mémoire juive et de cette histoire et de cette langue qu’on doit               
supposer être les siennes, mais qui a un moment donné ne le furent plus.”  81
 
Derrida further emphasized that for the French Algerian liberals, Frenchness was not only the              
‘law’ guiding their actions and criticisms of the French administration in Algeria, but also that               
which characterized their more intimate relationship to a colonizing power. He suggested that             
“though supporters of colonialism felt that they could force a language, culture, and institutions              
on others, their error was to think that it was theirs to impose”  or, rather, to take away.  82
Derrida’s experience as a Jewish French Algerian also led him to view religion as an               
imposition. To voice his influential Jewish identity, he contradicted Benjamin Stora’s point on             
the influence of the Vichy Regime: “le régime de Vichy et l’abrogation du décret Crémieux ont                
poussé les juifs d’Algérie à considérer l’assimilation promise par ce fameux décret comme leur              
bien le plus précieux.” Contrarily, for Derrida, the Vichy regime created a desire for integration               83
in the non-Jewish community and secularisation as a whole. He believed that “the secular today               
must be more rigorous with itself, more tolerant of religious culture and toward the possibility of                
religion being practised freely, unequivocally, and without confusion” as it did in pre-colonial             84
Algeria. He expanded such realizations in the context of any conflict fought in the name of                
religion: 
“Cette foi est la condition du lien social lui-même. Il n’y a pas de lien social sans une foi                   
… cette foi partagée, cette foi sans laquelle il n’y a pas de lien social, on peut et on doit                    
respecter les appartenances religieuses proprement dites… et je suis persuadé que les            
croyants authentiques … qui ne sont pas seulement des dogmatiques de ces religions,             
sont plus prêts à comprendre la religion de l’autre et à accéder à cette fois ... je suis                  
persuadé que les croyants authentiques, ceux qui ne sont pas ce que l’on appelle des               
81 ​Derrida, “L’anti-Macias,” ​Le Matin d’Algérie​,​ ​(21 Nov 2007), accessed April 29th, 2018, 
http://www.lematindz.net/news/373-lanti-macias-moi-lalgerien-de-jacques-derrida.html. 
82 Derrida, ​Le monolinguisme de l’autre​, (Stanford University Press, 1998), 39-40. 
83 ​Benjamin Stora, ​Les trois exils: Juifs d’Algérie​,​ ​(Stock Paris, 2006), 106. 
84 ​Derrida, Mustapha Chérif, ​Islam and the West​, 51. 
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 fondamentalistes, intégristes, dogmatiques, prêts à transformer leur croyance en arme de           
guerre sont plus prêts à comprendre la religion de l’autre et la foi universelle.”  85
 
There was a need, then, to differentiate between faith in religion and a universal faith in                
humanity and its members.  
The identifications as Jewish or Other stem from the interpellation of a racialising system              
and the dichotomous emotion of fear, necessary to produce racial animosities to this very day.               
Therefore, both Cixous and Derrida consistently oppose the reduction of Jewish ‘religious’ to             
Algerian ‘national’ identities that, for them, did not translate the diverse facets of far more               
complex and evolving identifications to multiple North African and other localities and            
heritages. They disapproved of the systemized sense of belonging that works through religious             
affiliation and that makes the Jewish identification a racial interpellation mechanism. Their            
theoretical interventions have undone the ideological heritage of French colonialism and help us             
to rethink the premises, hypotheses, and protocols of its imperial orientation dominated and             
preserved by the metropole’s culture. Their establishment of deconstruction bore fruit to the             
Franco Maghrebin identity, dissociating yet also including all that they have been identified as              
throughout their lives as French born Algerian Jews. They understood that it was only by               
deploying their French identity against itself that they could live up to its ideals, contradicted by                
Algeria’s colonization and the war for independence. Through their vast literary and scholarly             
production, they both rejected and valued their natural association with the French colonizers and              
their language. They described how they had been Othered and excluded by the different titles               
85 ​“L'anti-Macias” ​Le Matin d’Algérie​ (21 Nov 2007), accessed April 25, 2018. 
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 assigned to them in the vain efforts to strengthen either the French, Algerian, or Jewish among                
their identities in relation to a homeland both lost and found.  
 
Études de Cas des Entretiens; Interviews  
The six interviews conducted for this research and the analyses of Derrida’s and Cixous’s              
autobiographically inspired insights, have led me to expand on Gozlan’s initial four relatively             
constricted categories of ​Juifs d’Algérie ​during the War by including the following include four              
categories of ​Juifs d’Algérie after the war, following the declaration of Algeria’s independence             
on July 5th, 1962: 
1. Those who left for France, and were content to rejoin a ​Patrie ​greater than a ​département                
français​;  
2. Those who were displaced to France and found themselves in an identity conflict, having              
lost a home in which they were deemed colonizers and needing to construct another in               
which they were Othered;  
3. Those who either immediately immigrated to Israel, or made a stop in France before              
reaching the so-called national home of the Jewish people;  
4. Those who stayed in Algeria and adhered to the Algerian identity and homeland,             
insisting that despite the conflicting definitions, they were first and foremost Algerian.  
 
As indicated above , the applicability of these and other categories depend on their relevance at                
certain times and for certain time frames, that is, on the year of the displacement in question, the                  
individual’s age, social status, location, and so on and so forth. Each category, however,              
contributes to a better definition and understanding of identity as a function of a homeland one is                 
either naturally born into or that is constructed outside the proper birthplace. 
The return of the ​Juifs d’Algérie​’s to their past is best portrayed by the belated itinerary                
of some to the “Holy” Land of Israel. Even though Zionism had succeeded to establish its long                 
before the end of the Algerian War and its aftermath, its historical movement and founding of a                 
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 State proved less influential than the process of Europeanization that led France to be a preferred                
location for the construction of a homeland for the Jewish communities we have analyzed.              
However, sometime after the displacement to France, especially after the shock provoked by the              
Six Days War, the interest in the Hebrew State showed itself in a modest, yet consistent flow of                  
Jewish Algerian immigrants. The latter did not only succumb to a nostalgia sustained by              
aesthetics sensibilities, but also strangely perpetuated an ‘Oriental’ culture that been ripped from             
its origins in 1962.  
The Six Days War, carried out from June 5th 1967 until June 11th, changed the map of                 
the Middle East. The war’s outcome was considered a miracle by Israel’s supporters, and was               
seen as an unbelievable defeat in the Arab world. The tensions that brought about the war could                 
be traced back to Gamal Abdel Nasser Hussein’s, the second president of Egypt, nationalization              
of the Suez Canal, which resulted in France, Britain, and the State of Israel (the belated                
incarnation of the independent Jewish Nation Napoleon envisioned and that the British prepared             
and militarily trained) resuming their international diplomatic and military relations. Christian           
Pineau, the French Foreign Minister, representing both the outraged French and British owners             
of the International Canal Company, suggested that Israel start a war as the pretext for the                
intervention. Hence on 29th of October, 1956, Israeli forces crossed the border into Egypt. At a                
very short distance from the Canal, French and British forces ordered them to withdraw and               
arrived themselves in Port Said on November 5th, 1956. The consequent presence of the UN               
forces on the borders initiated a ten year period of unsigned peace, from 1957 until 1967.  86
86 ​"The War in 1967," video file, posted by Al Jazeera English, June 2, 2017, accessed April 26, 2018, 
http://aje.io/h9sr. 
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 By the end of those six days in June of 1967, Israel had doubled in size by conquering the                   
Golan Heights from Syria, the Gaza Strip and Eastern Jerusalem from Jordan, and the Sinai               
Peninsula from Egypt. After this victory, Algeria’s new Islamic governing body, sure of its Arab               
Muslim collective identity, proclaimed that any war with an Arab nation should be considered as               
its own. Since the early 1970s, Algeria’s adherence to the ​Nation Arabe shaped its attitude               
towards Israel’s existence, claiming, like many other Arab states, that peace with Israel would              
only be possible with the return of the territories captured in 1967. Nevertheless, for several ​Juifs                
d’Algérie ​the victory secured Israel as a viable option for diasporic Jews, Henri Atlan among               
them. He recalled how a substantial majority of California’s Jewish residents rushed to the Israeli               
embassy to offer their medical, technical, and social services when the war started and              
concluded: “Pour moi, pour la première fois, j’avais une solidarité avec Israël.”   87
This influence of the Jewish faith in relation to the concept, land, and state of Israel is                 
further explored by Jacques Leyris and Yossef Charvit, who both allude to the French Algerian               
Jewish devotion and their appreciation for the State of Israel:  
“Israël pour moi c'est un pays sacré, la première fois que j’étais en Eretz Israël c’était en                 
71, quand je suis descendu de l’avion, j'ai embrassé la terre. Parce que ça cest mon                
éducation c'est mon enfance, [et tant je lisais la Torah [...] ][le] paysage [d’Algérie] là j’ai                
vu en Israël.”   88
 
“Ma patrie? J'ai bien du mal à la définir ... Je pense que ma patrie est, dans mon coeur,                   
c'est Israël. Dans mon coeur. C'est Israël. On a une affinité, la même sentiment, même si                
on pense différemment sur certains problèmes, religieux, etc. Un juif vit pas hors de sa               
communauté, c'est impossible. Je pense que là est la vraie définition du juif ...”  89
 
“I had a very strong urge to live in the Eretz from what I heard and learned at home.                   90
From that perspective the Jewish and Zionist identity is very profound. And together with              
that the French identity is a culture that I appreciate immensely, which also helps me               
87 Henri Atlan, personal interview, January 8, 2018. 
88 Jacques Leyris, personal interview, January 20, 2018. 
89 Jacques Leyris, personal interview, January 20, 2018. 
90 Eretz: ​country ​in Hebrew; Israel is often referred to by Jews all around the world as ‘the Country’: ‘ha Eretz’. 
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 understand the hebraique identity. Because the Hebraique identity is very different from            
the jewish identity, the first is much more universal, while the other is reserved for               
exode.”  91
 
The two confirm both the virtue of Judaism in the Algerian Jewish home, strengthened by Jewish                
institutions such as the ​écoles Talmudiques​, and the relationship of the Jewish identity to the               
homeland. Similar to Denis Guénoun’s reflection that “L'Algérie ne m’a pas manqué du tout,              
parce que Algérie c’était la peur, c’était les bombes, c’était la maison détruite, c’était la menace,”               
Leyris reflects on how Algeria had displaced his sense of homeland and identity, regardless of                92
similarities between the Algerian and Israeli landscapes: 
“Le problème est que l’Algérie est un pays fermé. L’Algérie particulièrement,           
contrairement à la Tunisie ou le Maroc qui étaient de protectorats, ou les juifs sont restés                
sur place, en Algérie aucun juif n’est resté sur place. L’Algérie aujourd’hui c'est à dire est                
un pays ​Judenrein​. On va faire un pays ​Judenrein​, sans aucun Juifs. Pourquoi les Juifs?               
Parce qu'ils étaient des autochtones qui étaient là bien avant des Arabes, les Arabes sont               
arrivés après le 7ème siècle puis après ils ont bougé, les Ottomans, succession, bon … et                
comme la France a fait la guerre, elle n’était pas contre l'Algérie.” 
 
For Raymond Leyris however, a ​Judéo-Arab French Algerian, Algeria was “son territoire, ça             
veut dire sa terre… son élément,” concluding that his identity was that of “un vrai Algérien.”                93
Once again the difference between generations of fathers and sons is prevalent in the interviews.               
Leyris, who claimed to be solely French rather than French Algerian, could be compared to his                
father’s composed Algerian identity. In response, Charvit reflects on his conception of Algeria as              
a homeland, and explains how the difference in generations has contributed to the dissonance of               
the perception of Algeria as a place of birth rather than a homeland: 
“Algeria is not a homeland, it’s a very interesting diaspora, because of the proliferation of               
identities. There was a time when I was a little ashamed of this identity, it seemed to me                  
so clumsy and confused. It’s not really jewish and not really french, it’s not really               
anything, something like that. And these days i know that it’s in fact, everything. Algeria               
91 Yossef Charvit, personal interview, January 24, 2018. 
92 Denis Guénoun, personal interview, January 19, 2018. 
93 Jacques Leyris, personal interview, January 20, 2018. 
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 is the place of my birth, not my home. Especially since I left at such a young age and thus                    
don’t have these longings. When I was there I was happy to leave after three days. I felt                  
this weight, and fear. I experienced my parents notalgia, and finally I met the city that                
was this fantasized charming world that my parents spoke of.”   94
 
It should be noted that these two interviewees, Jacques Leiris and Yossef Charvit,             
constitute the oldest and the youngest interlocutors, substantially contributing to this           
investigation’s concentration on time and timing. While Leyris, old enough to have experienced             
the beauty of French Algeria and the perceived horrors of an independent Algeria, is conflicted               
and nostalgic, Charvit, who left Algeria at a young age, seems to be more composed. He                
explains: “I believe because I was very young it was easier to ask questions and solve them in an                   
harmonious and balanced way, blessed be God, and not in a radical one.” And yet, despite their                 95
departures at different times and ages and, hence, their differently constructed homelands, both             
refer to Derrida’s approach to the Jewish French Algerian identity as ineffective. Leyris             
criticized his deprecation of Judaism’s essence:  
“Derrida, ça c'est la génération qui a fait un boom aux États-Unis. Il a commencé à                
m'énerver pour une chose, la première chose il a dit que ce qui l'a embêté le plus dans sa                   
vie c'est quand il s'est fait renvoyé de l'école en Algérie parce qu'il était Juif. Et la                 
deuxième chose, c'est là où il m'a vraiment énervé, quand son père l'oblige à apprendre un                
petit passage de la torah pour faire sa bar mitzvah, et comment il a pu oser écrire des                  
conneries pareilles? Autrement, Derrida n'avait pas de problème à apprendre le grec mais             
l'hébreu si, il l’avait. Or l'hébreu c'est fondamental,”  96
 
Differentiating between his own and Derrida’s recognition of the Jewish faith, Charvit also             
discusses the latter’s choice to deconstruct without the essential subsequent reconstruction:  
“I believe the Algerian Judaism is the most balanced. It has tradition and modern, East               
and West, holy and sand, there is a universal, individual, and national identity, and all are                
balanced. There’s place for everything, you can be religious, but modern. You can have              
an appreciation of the European culture, and with that of Judaism as well [...] 
94 Yossef Charvit, personal interview, January 24, 2018, translated from Hebrew to English by Britt Shacham. 
95 Ibid.,  translated from Hebrew to English by Britt Shacham. 
96 Jacques Leyris, personal interview, January 20, 2018. 
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 Derrida got very confused. He said he had too many identities and thus got lost. So he                 
researched deconstruction … I, on the other hand, didn’t only deal with deconstruction             
but also reconstruction of a full identity, the hebraique identity.”  97
 
The two educated, welcoming, and ​chaleureux ​interviewees that so kindly agreed to            
contribute to this research’s purpose, inspire various conclusions on the ​Juifs d’Algérie​’s            
perception of identity, homeland, displacement, and the way these three interconnect. For both,             
the Jewish identity directed the French and Algerian, making Israel the constructed homeland             
distinct from their place of birth. While Leyris holds the experience of losing his father on                
Algerian soil as the ground for his displacement, Charvit, who ended up in the Jewish Nation                
shortly after his displacement from Algeria, reflected on the mélange of the three collective              
identities: “I am very happy to belong to this trilogy of Algeria, France, and Israel. It’s a                 
wonderful story in my opinion, wonderful journey if you take the right paths, which is               
deconstruction, and reconstruction. The conjoining of opposites. A great contribution to the            
Jewish Nation.”   98
The previously mentioned hope for a double nationality contributed to the initially            
lessened and then almost extinguished Jewish presence in Algeria. In July of 1962, a law was                
adopted that legalized the automatic maintenance of the French nationality for all former French              
residents of Algeria. The binationality allowed the ​Juifs d’Algérie ​to reexamine the possibility of              
staying in an independent Algeria without losing their option to leave, which was after all               
granted by their ​Patrie​. Between 1963 and 1965, out of the 296 naturalized citizens thanks to the                 
“participation à la lutte de libération” (among whom twenty-one were considered Jewish under             
the Vichy regime), only 94 non-Muslim ​indigènes ​were to be found in Algeria. One of these                
97 Yossef Charvit, personal interview, January 24, 2018, translated from Hebrew to English by Britt Shacham. 
98 Ibid., translated from Hebrew to English by Britt Shacham. 
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 individuals, Jean Pierre Lledo, breaks down his itinerary and at times forced choices as we               
reflect on his experiences over sweetened mint tea and nuts in his home in Jaffa (an originally                 
Arab Israeli city). Consistent with the theme of fathers and sons, he depicts his father’s and his                 
‘communist’ reasoning for  staying in a considerably deformed independent Algeria:  
“Dans la conception communiste de l'indépendance, c'était une Algérie multi-ethnique,          
les Musulmans, les Juifs, les Chrétiens … Il est resté bien que la majorité de Juifs sont                 
tous partis pour une raison simple, qu'après l'indépendance l'Algérie avait une           
constitution et un code de la nationalité, et dans ce code, on disait que seul les                
Musulmans avait la nationalité automatiquement ... Alors les communistes qui s'étaient           
battus par une Algérie indépendante, en prison, tortures, etc.m se sont dit ‘mais comment              
on nous a fait ça? [...] 
Quelques uns comme mon père, même si c’était très rare, sont restés en Algérie, donc je                
suis resté … pour qu’en 62, plus d’un million de personnes ont dû quitter l'Algérie, donc                
l'Algérie a changé son visage, d’un jour à l'autre, il manque 1 million de personnes dans                
les rues.”   99
 
Lledo recalls his temporary displacement to France and attributes it to two specific,             
interconnected reasons. To address the first, he tells of Algeria’s first day of independence:  
“Le 5 juillet 1962, le jour même de l'indépendance il y a eu un massacre terrible à Oran,                  
ma ville quand j'étais petit ... Organisé par le FLN et par l'armée aussi parce qu'il y avait                  
une lutte aussi entre l'armée et le FLN … les arabes sont sortis dans les rues, ils attrapent                  
le peuple, ils les égorgent les attrapent, et ils les jettent dans un lac qui se trouve dans la                   
périphérie d'Oran. Il y a eu 67 personnes, presque tous intellectuels, qui ont été assassinés               
[...] 
Il y avait des gens qui étaient restés comme ça à Oran, mais quand il y avait le massacre 
du 5 juillet, c'est un message, ça veut dire PARTEZ, vite!”  100
 
Having witnessed these atrocities, immediately following the independence, he justifies his           
timely departure by addressing the central question this investigation implicitly seeks to address             
and analyse regarding the relationship between identity relation and the homeland: 
“J’ai décidé d'aller à Paris, et j'ai décidé d’y aller, pour une seule chose, pas tellement                
pour les études mais pour savoir si j'étais français ou pas, parce qu’en 62, mon père était                 
pour l'indépendance et moi je l'étais aussi, même si j'étais petit, mais j'étais très politisé à                
l'époque, même à dix ans je pouvais expliquer qu’est ce que l'indépendance... 
99 Jean Pierre Lledo, personal interview, January 11, 2018. 
100 ​Jean Pierre Lledo, personal interview, January 11, 2018. 
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Le problème est que quand je suis arrivé en France .. Les six mois, il pleuvait toujours, il                  
faisait gris, les gens n'étaient pas sympathiques, enfin, c'est comme ça que je l'ai ressenti,               
et moi je me suis dit bon non moi je suis pas français…Je me sentais algérien, et d'une                  
part je voulais pas utiliser le passeport français, pour moi, c'était juste pour rentrer en               
Algérie.”  101
 
Moreover, Lledo comes to the following conclusion about his French identity: 
 
“La France, je l’ai jamais considéré comme ma ​Patrie​, même quand j'ai eu le passeport               
Français, mais je considère pas la France comme ma ​Patrie​, la France m’apporte             
beaucoup de choses, ma culture, ma langue, la possibilité de réfugié, 1993, je suis pas               
anti-français mais je me sens pas français.”  102
 
After the 1990s, Algeria’s Armed Islamic Group declared war on all non-Muslims, driving most              
of the remaining ​Juifs d’Algérie ​to emigration. Having returned to document his forbidden             
homeland, Lledo makes the following observations on its state driven by a brutal agenda:  
“En 93 les Islamistes vont développer la lutte armée. Ils commencent à tuer directement.              
La première catégorie est les policiers, pour avoir les armes. Ensuite les intellectuels. Et              
pour les policiers c’était le lundi, pour les intellectuels c’était le mardi, tous les mardis, on                
tue un intellectuel.”  103
 
Despite his eventual return to Algeria and the fact that in 1968 one could still find about                 
7,000 ​Juifs d’Algérie in an ​Algérie algérienne​, the marginalizing constitution that only            
nationalized Algerian Muslims and did not tolerate any exceptions withered the hope of staying.              
As we sit on his terrace, the muezzin’s melodies set a melancholic tone for Lledo’s memories of                 
a continuously violent independent Algeria, including his subsequent hypothesis for why:  
“J’ai compris que le FLN avait un but terroriste de faire partir les gens non musulmans.                
Avant même l’indépendance parce que le FLN, comme dans tous les pays arabes, le              
nationalisme, ne sait pas gérer le problème multi ethnique. [...] 
Ils ont fait un congrès, très agressif. Comme les nazis, bien organisé, avec des gens qui 
s’habillent en militaire, c’est effrayant, impressionnant. Ils ont commencé à agresser les 
101 ​ Jean Pierre Lledo, personal interview, January 11, 2018.  
102 ​ Jean Pierre Lledo, personal interview, January 11, 2018. 
103 ​ Jean Pierre Lledo, personal interview, January 11, 2018. 
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 gens, des femmes, des femmes célibataires, ils ont mis le feu dans les maisons de femmes 
seules en disant qu'elles étaient prostituées.”  104
 
The choice on which land to construct a home is the culmination point of Lledo’s               
reflections as the sun sets on the Mediterranean coast: 
“Jusqu’à une certaine époque j’ai voulu être algérien, j’ai voulu que l’Algérie c’est mon              
pays. Mais c’était un acte personnel. Volontariste. Parce que j’étais né en Algérie je              
croyais que cela suffisait, pour dire que c'est ma ​Patrie​. Je me suis rendu conte que j’ai                 
pu vivre en Algérie autant de temps parce que je n’avais pas posé de questions, la                
question de 62, et la questions des Juifs. Or ces deux questions, c'est fondamental pour sa                
propre identité. [...] 
 
À partir du moment que j’ai rencontré Israël, instinctivement, quelque chose que j’avais             
pas analysé, j’ai tout de suite compris que là, c’était ma ​Patrie​. Voilà. Ma maison. Et                
d’ailleurs, quand je suis venu au début il y avait une amie que je connaissais pas, il y                  
avait un amie qui venait me chercher à l’aéroport et il ma dit: Il faut revenir à la maison.                   
[...] 
 
Et c’est très fort. En plus, je me sentais pas français, mais j’étais plus algérien, alors                
évidemment, Israël c’est devenu comme un aimant très très fort. À partir de là, il fallait                105
prendre la décision de faire Alliyah de venir ‘à la maison.’”   106
  
The categorization of identities, the Vichy Regime, ​la Guerre d’Algérie​, and an            
independent Algeria have inspired many questions, theories, and explanations on what one’s            
religion and nationality could entail. The various statuses the ​Juifs d’Algérie were given in pre-               
and post-1870 Algeria reveal the fundamental political and legal tensions within the Algerian             
society. They thus serve as a prime example of both successful and unsuccessful ‘assimilation’              
took place between colonizers and colonized, superior and inferior, French and Algerian, secular             
and religious. Defined as this or that by individuals and collectives, during and after the war, the                 
Juifs d’Algérie never constituted a homogenous historical actor whose collective destiny was            
clear in this context. They were rather a flexible social category whose political and legal               
104 ​ Jean Pierre Lledo, personal interview, January 11, 2018. 
105  Magnet. 
106 ​ Jean Pierre Lledo, personal interview, January 11, 2018. 
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 transitions became the subject of both colonial and national contradictions present in France,             
Algeria, and from the outset also in Israel, which will need to be further analyzed so as to fully                   
appreciate its historical fates and predicaments as well as its lasting significance. 
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 Conclusion  
A. Nostalgérie 
 
Since Algeria’s colonization by the French in 1830, it has become the prime example of               
how the conception and perception of the homeland are historically conditioned and socially             
constructed. The generations that followed the initial diasporas that sought refuge in Algeria             
demonstrated how a homeland could de facto be construed or imagined around an identity,              
regardless of place of birth.  
In his PhD dissertation ​Homesick Epoch: Dying of Nostalgia in Post-Revolutionary           
France​, Thomas W. Dodman speaks of this direct correlation between the homeland and one’s              
place of birth. He refers to the case of Jérôme Lassere, a military surgeon displaced from                
Lot-et-Garrone and stationed in lower Rhine as part of the First Battalion. He desired to be                
repositioned and claimed he’d be a more useful military surgeon if he were to serve in his ​Patrie​.                  
When the French armies of the Rhine and the Moselle struggled to contain Austrian and Prussian                
forces invading from the East in November 1793, the medical condition of nostalgia became the               
only way to return to the homeland rather than the suffered wounds of combat. The essential part                 
of this story is that Lassere blamed his sickly symptoms on his permanence in Alsace, a “region                 
very different to that in which [he] was born.” Justifying the relationship between spatial              107
displacement and his body’s physical deterioration, the condition of nostalgia was diagnosed as             
an obscure identity rather than a distinguished body. Lassere’s ultimate fate has less to do with                
our research than his phenomenon of affliction when he felt displaced not just from any land but                 
107 Thomas W. Dodman, “Homesick Epoch: Dying of Nostalgia in Post-Revolutionary France,” (PhD diss., 
University of Chicago, 2011), UMI (3472835), 100. 
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 from his place of birth more specifically. Dodman summarizes Lassere’s case of nostalgia as              
“the repressed symptom of a displacement from ‘home.’”   108
To address this same symptom that also manifested itself in Algeria, another French             
military surgeon, Jean-Pierre Bonnafont, proposed to create a network of ​dépôts de            
convalescence ​that would be set up near French Mediterranean ports, such as Marseille and the               
regions along the shores of Algeria. Based on the phenomenon diagnosed among the French              
soldiers stationed in Mount Boudjaréah, at the outskirts of Algiers, Bonnafont believed that             
redirecting convalescents would not only have a positive impact on their health but would also               
serve as the first step towards their ‘acclimitazation.’ Organized by French military physicians             
and government authorities in Algeria, the network he thus set up aimed to cure “homesickness               
outbursts” by “removing the soldiers from the theatre of operations and exposing them to a more                
familiar French environment.” Considering France as the land for which they longed, and             109
Algeria as the land in which they were treated and healed, an internalized complex was formed                
that captured the sense of where it was that one felt at ease, secure, and, most importantly, at                  
home. Similarities between Algeria and France were further analyzed in order to create or              
simulate previously nonexistent ties such as the “exposed pure and fresh air, similar to the one                
they breathed au ​pays natal ​…,” ​which served as the first connection between the two distinct                110
lands separated by the Mediterranean. Dodman’s research shows that the problem of nostalgic             
longing, and its remedies, form crucial ingredients of our study of the ​Juifs d’Algérie and,               
indeed, hold great relevance for any other displaced people forced to distinguish between place              
of birth and home.  
108 Ibid.,103. 
109 Ibid., 372. 
110 Ibid., 373. 
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 The diagnosis of nostalgia is an attempt to grasp the emotional turmoil wrought by              
displacement and, in this sense, reflects more than merely the effects of so-called “processes of               
modernization.” Could the remedy for nostalgia indeed be nostalgia itself as it sustains the image               
of the homeland, as Dodman asserts? A disease prominent among the Swiss compatriots in the               
1680s and referred to colloquially as ​maladie du pays ​in French, nostalgia has remained              
abundantly present in modern times. As migrations became means for diasporas, and            
displacements from homelands became natural phenomena, in June 1873 nostalgia was deemed            
benign. Ever since, the term nostalgia has been reserved for a wider variety of battles and fields.                 
Indeed, it may well serve as the ​Juifs d’Algérie​’s primary mental and cultural source of               
preserving their ancestry and place of birth in their constructed homelands.  
After encountering and analyzing a diverse group of displaced ​Juifs d’Algérie​, I believe it              
is safe to assume that another prime source of preserving an entity’s collective identity,              
especially when the return to its geographical borders is no longer possible, is the conservation of                
culture. Culture, referring to a historical and social feature of both peoples people and              
communities, is a “prime instrument through which groups mobilize themselves, construct their            
collective identity, and effect their solidarity by excluding those whom they identify as             
outsiders.” Culture, family, customs, and traditions one is born into, adopts as normal, and              111
passes on to the next generation, like the very idea of home and homeland, is usually associated                 
with the place of birth. Atlan, who, for his part, rejects the term of homeland, concludes that                 
culture must rather be seen as a function of nationality or, to put it in terms this investigation has                   
used throughout: identity can be understood as a function of the homeland:  
111 ​Lincoln, ​Holy Terrors​, 52. 
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 “A land is not a homeland. The ​Juifs d’Algérie didn’t come to Israel to find their                
homeland, their homeland is France. Especially in Judaism, a homeland is just something             
that doesn’t fit. You could say that the French Jews’ homeland is France, because their               
culture comes from there. The homeland of the Russian Jews is Russia, hence they speak               
Russian among themselves even though they live in Israel. [...]  
The majority of Jews, even today, live happily, comfortably, and in peace around the              
world by building their own communities within the diverse destinations.”  112
 
This research thus questions the very idea that culture can be contained by national              
boundaries and alludes to a greater, supernatural solidifier that cannot be doubted and hence acts               
as an absolute unifying instance: religion. With its unique capacity to stabilize and buttress all               
aspirations, religion gives human preferences a divine right and transcendent status. This            
component of culture, as we can conclude from this research, can exacerbate a conflict, as               
esthetic and ethical preferences can transform discriminations into sacred duties. As a result of              
this tendency, a culture’s nation becomes “a​n imagined political community - and imagined as              
both inherently limited and sovereign… imagined because the members of even the smallest             
nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in                  
the minds of each lives the image of their communion,” separated into different ‘sects.’ ​One is                113
thus not only born into different variations of faith, defined by familial ties, conducts, morals,               
monotheism, polytheism, esthetic, and ethical preferences, indeed, sustained by an imagined           
community, but is also educated to make meta-judgments about a host of things in the name of                 
one’s culture, acting as an individual representative of a collected whole. 
The secularizing character of the modern state and the potentially religious character of             
the nation result in an unresolved tension between two separate genealogies and divergent             
characters. When Europe exported the nation-state formation to the rest of the world via              
112 ​Henri Atlan, personal interview, January 8, 2018. 
113 ​Benedict R. Anderson, ​Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism​, 
(London: Verso 2016), 37. 
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 colonialism, the divergence between the state as an instrument designed to contain (or             
monopolize) violence, on the one hand, and the nation as one with the capacity to effectively                
mobilize and unleash identifications, on the other, imposed itself as a global model whose              
fundamental traits prevail to this day. There is ample historical and empirical evidence for how               
much of an influence religion can exert, both in terms of its unifying and divisive effects. The                 
case Algeria, as of France and Israel, comes to mind.  
Depending on the circumstances of both nations and states, religion can either become a              
prime source of national identity and connect insurgent groups with coreligionary supporters            
across social boundaries, as happened in the formation of the State of Israel and then also in the                  
struggle for an independent Algeria. But, instead, it can also mark an internal cleavage that needs                
to be overcome by stressing other sources of unity within the borders of a pluralistic state. Again,                 
examples of this can be found in the colonial rule of the French in Algeria and that of the State of                     
Israel over its Israeli-Arab conflict within its borders as well as Palestinian populations in the               
occupied territories. The nation or political community is therefore at best ​imagined precisely             
because of the fact that, “​regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in                
each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal, comradeship. Ultimately it is this               
fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not                 
so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings.”   114
When nationality becomes a byproduct of religion, ​postcolonialism becomes an ethos and            
not simply a politics of opposition. ​In both French Algeria and Palestine under the British               
Mandate, for instance, ​members of the majority religion, namely Islam, felt that the state              
114 Ibid., 41.  
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 operated to their systematic disadvantage, while benefiting members of minority religions,           
notably the Jews, from whom they may have also felt estranged on other grounds. In such                
circumstances, the disaffected can find powerful instruments of agitation and mobilization in            
narratives that recall the grandeur of ‘their’ past as a critique of an objectionable present.               
Nostalgic, the suffering communities mobilize around their religious identity to challenge those            
of other faiths and the State that prefers them.  
In Algeria, religion became a privileged instrument for the rallying of nationalist            
sentiment. For the colonized, the real trauma was colonialism, “which threatened not just             
profanation of what is holy, but profound destabilization of cultural patterns in which religion is               
inextricably interwoven.” Yet restoring religion to its dominant position within a culture            115
hardly puts an end to a conflict; instead, it simply ensures that a culture’s most bruising conflicts                 
will assume religious, rather than ethical, political or aesthetic or even nationalist character.             
Thus, whatever success the suffering community might have, including independence, comes           
wrapped in cruel irony. Examples of insurgents that met with ‘success’ and gained hope of               
winning the internal conflict are the Muslim Brotherhood in Algeria, Ultra-Orthodox activists in             
Israel, and Hamas in Palestine. They all expanded their goals to reform and expand policies that                
would reconstruct the state along explicitly drawn religious lines and thus secure their absolute              
power. 
Thus, wars between nation-states were replaced by what now appear as wars between             
religious communities. “Communities and institutions that define themselves in terms of religion            
still wage their conflicts primarily around rival claims to scarce resources: people, territory,             
115 Lincoln, ​Holy Terrors​, 64. 
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 wealth, positions of power, and economic advantage, but also nonmaterial resources as dignity,             
prestige, and all manner of symbolic capital.” Despite the variations of theism that were              116
practiced in Algeria, the colonized within it saw no need to minimize their religious initiatives or                
their culture’s integrity, as had happened in an early modern Europe traumatized by Religious              
Wars. It was rather the colonizers’ intrusion and degradation of the colonized from rightful              
citizens to indigenous subjects that brought about a trauma which, at its core, intended to free                
one from another: the religious from the secular, the dependent from the independent, the              
revolutionary from the silent.  
 
B. Wholly or Holy? 
 
“​Vous connaissez la blague de Ben Gurion? Quand on lui dit: 'alors, après la              
mort qu’est-ce que vous voudriez, aller au paradis ou en enfer?' Et il dit ‘ah bon                
je sais pas, il faudrait d'abord que je les vois.’ Alors on lui montre, on lui montre                 
le paradis, il voit bien des gens sérieux tout ça qui ont l’air de s'ennuyer, et on lui                  
montre l'enfer, et il voit des gens qui s’amusent ... Alors il dit, ‘bon moi je choisis                 
ça.’ Une fois qu’il est mort il est là en enfer et tout d’un coup, il pense ‘c'est pas                   
exactement ce que je voyais avant,’ et on lui dit ‘oui parce avant tu étais touriste                
maintenant tu es Oleh Chadash [Newcomer].​”  117
 
I first learned about ​La Guerre d’Algérie ​during my year abroad when I took a course on                 
Francophone literature. To provide for my sustained interest in the field, I took a further class on                 
Francophone cinema the following semester. The thought of people losing their homeland to             
colonialism and, simultaneously, of others constructing their own home within it, made a deep              
impression and kept me wondering: “when is exile from a land justified? Is it ever? What gives                 
one the authority to claim a land as one’s own? Does one’s place of birth and, consequently,                 
one’s nationality define one’s homeland?” As I was already taken with the Europeans of Algeria,               
116 Ibid., 74. 
117 Henri Atlan, personal interview, January 8, 2018. 
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 and familiarized myself with their voices and faces through literary and theoretical ​oeuvres and              
visual materials, I came up with a working hypothesis that I thought might guide my senior                
thesis. Could it be, so I asked, that Israel had become the new Algeria for the French Jews? This                   
initial speculation was based on the following observation: while the French metropole offers a              
culture, education, and ideals, Algeria and Israel offer an ambiance, scenery, and sense of              
community particular to the Mediterranean coast.  As Lledo recalled his first arrival in Israel: 
“Alors je me suis taillé à Jérusalem, j’ai passé sur le marché Machne Yehuda, et je me                 
suis dit mais c'est comme un marché Juif d'Oran, quand j'étais petit. Quand j’étais petit,               
c'était 1955, en ce moment là, je suis en 2008, il y avait à peu près cinquante ans qui sont                    
passés.”   118
 
My subsequent investigations confirmed such similarities between the two territories that I            
envisioned served almost the same purpose as an ongoing reference for the members of the               
French Jewish community with whom I conducted extensive interviews to test my hypothesis.             
And yet, the hypothesis as I formulated it, also proved also somewhat painful as it directly                
addressed a traumatic subject and, in my conversations, a group too traumatized to impose yet               
another displacement, identity and homeland on.  
I realized that, in fact, the association between the three entities all by itself forced me to                 
include a fourth or a fifth, namely occupying Israel and Palestine. Suddenly, Israel was not the                
new Algeria for the French Jews but rather assumed the role of France as a colonial power, with                  
the Palestinians in the position of the colonized Algerians. Such bold assertions base themselves              
on the in-depth study of all relevant territories in question, and involve, once again, the themes of                 
colonialism, post-colonialism, nationalism, nationality, and religion. It is necessary, without          
expanding too much on such complex matters, to dedicate at least part of this conclusion to                
118 ​Jean Pierre Lledo, personal interview, January 11, 2018. 
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 Israel’s recent history so as to explain how is it that a country with a relatively short history                  
could come to resemble France’s colonial power in some relevant aspects.  
In 1948, Israel was declared an independent state in Palestine, an event that inaugurated              
great celebration for the Jewish people turned nation, just as it meant a catastrophe, Al Nakba,                
for the Palestinians. The Nakba, however, had started long before 1948 and lasted for more than                
70 years. The original story starts in 1799, outside the city of Acre in Ottoman controlled                
Palestine. An army led by Napoleon Bonaparte besieged the city, as part of an attempt to defeat                 
the Ottomans and establish a French presence in the region. In search of allies, Napoleon issued a                 
letter, offering Palestine as a Jewish homeland, that would be under French protection, for its               
diaspora Jews. To secure such an establishment, he called on no more than 3,000 Jews in                
Palestine to rise up against what he called their ‘oppressors.’ Although substantially publicized             
and worthy of a statue on a hill (named after him), overlooking Acre, Napoleon was ultimately                
defeated. Although the project for a Jewish homeland remained unfulfilled, it was revived 40              
years later by  another prominent colonial power, namely Great Britain. 
The pursuit of a Jewish homeland was simultaneously sustained by what the Austrian             
writer Nathan Birnbaum termed in 1885 as Zionism. Derived from the word Zion, one of the                119
biblical names for Jerusalem, zionism came to mean the establishment of a Jewish homeland in               
Palestine. While Jews outside of the homeland, especially European and American Jews, took             
great pride in the initiated project, Jews in Palestine were not enthusiastic. They were locals, not                
Zionists, just like the ​Juifs d’Algérie ​had initially refused the French citizenship when it was               
offered, as they considered themselves not French patriots, but Algerian citizens. In 1896,             
119 ​"​Al-Nakba - Episode 1," video file, YouTube, posted by Al Jazeera English, May 8, 2013, accessed April 26, 
2018, ​https://www.youtube.com/​watch?v=H7FML0wzJ6A.  
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 Theodor Herzl, an Austro-Hungarian Jewish journalist, wrote the most important text of early             
Zionism, ​Der Judenstaat​, ​The Jewish State​, in which he layed out a future for an independent                
Jewish State. People in favor of this proposal visited the land and concluded: “the bride is                
beautiful, but she’s married to another man.” And, remarkably, Jewish French born Algerians             120
living in Israel today use  similar imagery to express  their relationship to the country:  
“The connection between the Jewish people and to the land of Israel is not between a                
mother or a father with their offspring [and hence not a ​Patrie​]. I would say Israel is the                  
wife of the Jewish Nation.”  121
 
In the 19th century however, the spouse was an existing and thriving Palestinian society              
indigenous to the soil which today defines the borders of the Jewish Nation. In 1897, the first                 
Zionist congress was convened in the Swiss city of Basel. Herzl convened the major European               
powers and exploited the competition between them by promising that whoever swore to protect              
such a possible entity, would be provided for its needs. The model of Israel’s socialist Zionist                
founders was based on the movement’s success in building a state in as much of the Jewish                 
people’s imagined ancient homeland as was possible. This state-building project was in principle             
understood as dialectically related to rebuilding the Jewish nation, a relationship expressed in the              
popular Zionist slogan “to build and to built by,” while at the same time it expressed willingness                 
to accept partition in order to consolidate Jewish sovereignty in just part of the Land of Israel.                 
But David Ben-Gurion, and other mainstream labor Zionist leaders, by contrast always            
maintained the superiority of Jewish rights to the whole land. In their eyes, those were rights that                 
could be exercised in the name of the Jewish faith whenever circumstances, dictated by the ever                
120 Ibid. 
121 Henri Atlan, personal interview, January 8, 2018. Translated from Hebrew to English by Britt Shacham. 
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 present Israeli-Palestinian conflict, made it possible and prudent to do so. Atlan provided us with               
his personal perception of Zionism and its dangers: 
“Il y a un passage au Talmud qui dit que Dieu a dispersé les juifs à peu près partout dans                    
le monde entier pour pas être tous détruits ensemble, ça veut dire, en français on dit il                 
faut pas mettre toutes les pommes dans le même panier, parce que si vous perdiez le                
panier il n'y a plus de pommes. Alors à l’époque je pense absolument pas que le Sionisme                 
était la solution pour les juifs.”  122
 
And yet, despite the skepticisms and dire warnings, the UN Resolution 181, consisting of 33               
votes for, 13 against, and 10 abstentations, divided Palestine into an Arab and Jewish State (with                
Jerusalem being an internationalized State) and the State of Israel was signed into existence              123
with the stroke of a pen. 
Combined with the ‘pioneer’ ethos of state- and nation-building, Israel’s ideological           
position made it difficult for most of the new state’s political class to resist the attraction of                 
assuming state-building tasks also in those portions of the Land of Israel ​occupied by the Jewish                
state in 1967. The aura of invincibility that accompanied the victory of the Six Days War, in June                  
of 1967, was not only the start of an increased Jewish Algerian migration towards Israel, but also                 
that of greater complications that plague the Middle East until this very day: 
“After the Six Days War, Ishai Albowitz said and published that we must immediately              
give back all the captured territories to the Arabs, because if not we will be in a state of                   
occupation. No one in the Jewish Nation agreed because they thought and hoped the              
Arabs will just recognize the State of Israel and everything will be fine. However, as a                
result the Arab league in Sudan decided three things: ‘no to recognition, no to peace, and                
no to negotiation.’ [...] 
And so, ​we ​were left in the state of occupation, and that’s the Arabs’ biggest victory on                 
us​, they forced the State of Israel to continue with the occupation. It was a trap! And now                  
we have settlements since people took advantage of the situation.”  124
 
122 Henri Atlan, personal interview, January 8, 2018. 
123 ​"Al-Nakba - Episode 2," video file, YouTube, posted by Al Jazeera English, May 15, 2013, accessed April 26, 
2018, ​https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yI2D5Fsd9lg​. 
124 Henri Atlan, personal interview, January 8, 2018, translated  from Hebrew to English by Britt Shacham. 
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 Israel found itself responsible for governing a million Palestinians in their newly captured             
territories. In 1969, Israel’s Prime Minister Golda Meir stated: “It was not as though there was a                 
Palestinian people in Palestine considering itself as a Palestinian people and we came and threw               
them out and took their country away from them. They did not exist,” thereby blatantly               125
denying the fact that, in 1949, Israel violated the international agreement in seizing more land               
than the UN initially allowed. More than 400 Palestinian villages and 11 cities were destroyed,               
111,000 Palestinians became refugees, while 13,000 were killed, and 30,000 injured. This            126
sheer denial of confiscating Palestinian land has remained prevalent in subsequent ruling            
governments of the State of Israel until this very day.  
The similarities between French Algeria and the State of Israel, on the one hand, and the                
Muslim Algerians and the Palestinians, on the other, are uncanny and practically justify my              
initial hypothesis for this research project. It seems as though the Palestinians have assumed the               
unfortunate role of the Jews as persecuted, expulsed, refuged, and diasporic. While before there              
was the “Jewish Question,” now there is the “Palestinian Question.” Moreover, while throughout             
history, especially from 1939 until 1945, Jews were subject to ethnic cleansing, to put it mildly,                
an almost similar fate of the Palestinians was initiated simultaneously. For a while the Holocaust               
propelled Zionism into a State but also took about 6 million Jewish lives, there are currently 6                 
million Palestinian refugees dispersed around the world. And while Jews were known for             127
having the most prominent diaspora, now the Palestinians have become the only society solely              
composed of refugees; while the land “without people” for people without a land was              
125 ​"Al-Nakba - Episode 3," video file, YouTube, posted by Al Jazeera English, May 21, 2013, accessed April 26, 
2018,  ​https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5SKECszemmA​. 
126 ​Ibid.  
127 ​"Al-Nakba - Episode 4," video file, YouTube, posted by Al Jazeera English, May 28, 2013, accessed April 26, 
2018. ​https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0m__A7MlDrk​. 
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 meticulously designed to create the Jewish Nation, now the Palestinians, a people without a land,               
search for a land without people. And, while Kahina, mentioned in the first chapter, led the                
Judéo-Berbère ​troops against the Arab invasion of Algeria, Mouhiba Khorshid commanded           
revolutionary Palestinian troops to conserve Jaffa under Israeli rule. Finally, while Yitzhak            
Shamir, Israel’s former Prime Minister and head of the Zionist nationalist Stern gang, published              
a biography of all the terrorist operations he carried out to secure Israel’s conquered territories               
(including the murder of Folke Bernadotte, the United Nations Security Council at the time,              
dedicated to the Palestinian cause), so did Général Aussaresses, in Mon Témoignage sur la              
torture​, when he described the horrific actions he was ordered to perform, confirming these acts               
were done voluntarily as he refused to claim ‘Je regrette’ (when he had the chance to in front of                   
the Parisian court in November of 2001). In sum, while there is the Jewish Nation, there is also                  
the Arab Nation, consistently placed against one another by outside forces.  
Juifs d’Algérie​, Algerian Muslims, and Palestinians were all deemed indigenous in their            
own land. Both the French and the British colonial powers chose to assimilate the Jews rather                
than the Muslims, disrupting the symbiosis present prior to their arrival. In French Algeria and               
during the transformation of Palestine into the State of Israel, patriotism was not only confiscated               
by a colonial power but also forbidden. Both Algerians and Palestinians, unlike the French or               
Israelis, not only lost the battle, but the whole war itself. The story continues and we don’t know                  
how it is going to end. People live as dead, without a homeland, and with no possible return to a                    
home. “Feeling at home is a condition of being free in the most fundamental way of being free –                   
a condition of being creative in a particular way – naturally” and thus, expelling people from                128
128 Margalit, “Isaiah Berlin, Home and Homeland,” lecture chair: Ian Buruma, Fonds DOTS (June 1-6 2009). 
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 their home and preventing their return is a war crime as such. People are trapped in their                 
consciousness or, on the contrary, unconscious of the injustice surrounding them. The Jewish             
Nation has produced Jewish citizens who fail to recognize what troubled their homeless and              
rootless ancient ancestors, and who are, hence, capable of oppressing others. ​In light of recent               
events, and given the persistence of anti-semitism in France attributed to North Africans, I think               
it is of the utmost importance to reexamine historical claims, traumas, and the racisms of today’s                
world in light of each other.  
The recent murder of Holocaust survivor Mireille Knoll, on March 23rd in Paris, has              
exposed two toxic racisms, often attributed to anti-semitism and Islamophobia, notably prevalent            
in France. In both of these racisms, essentially driven by feelings of exclusion, ​the sentiment of                
being a “victim” predominates. France offers a unique environment for these hateful associations             
to foster, as it is the sole country to have a collective guilty conscience toward ​both its Jews and                   
its Arabs: toward its Jews, for the active collaboration of the Vichy regime with the Nazi                
occupiers, and toward its Arabs for the colonial history in North Africa and the inhumane crimes                
committed by the French army during the Algerian War of Independence. Each prejudice             129
perversely feeds on the other, sustaining exclusion and groups closing in on themselves. Against              
this background, Frantz Fanon, Algeria’s ​fils adoptif​, appropriately used the line that he had been               
taught by his philosophy professor: “When you hear someone insulting the Jews, pay attention;              
he is talking about you.” The line remains topical, and both French Arabs and French Jews                
129 ​ Sylvain Cypel, “The Murder of ​The Murder of Holocaust Survivor Mireille Knoll Has Exposed 2 Toxic Racisms 
in France,” trans. Arun Kapil, ​The Nation​, (April 6, 2018), accessed April 27, 2018, 
https://www.thenation.com/article/the-murder-of-holocaust-survivor-mireille-knoll-has-exposed-two-toxic-racisms-i
n-france/. 
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 would do well to adopt it and understand that “when you hear someone insulting Muslims, he is                 
also talking about you.”  130
Whichever ‘you’ one embodied or represented in the Algerian War, be it the ​Juifs              
d’Algérie​, second generation French Algerians, indigenous groups, Pieds Noirs or the Harkis            
(i.e., the Algerians who claimed an usually unfortunate fate when choosing to fight alongside              
rather than against the French), they all were implicated either directly or indirectly in the search                
for a nostalgic identity displaced from its homeland. Hence the theme of nostalgia in the case of                 
Algeria, ​nostalgérie , is a crucial component in the construction of the displaced and exiled              
identity of the communities in question. The idealization of a forbidden homeland creates a              
nostalgia relying on previous imagined communities, preserved by a nation’s overall culture.            
Therefore, when the homeland is eventually reached it doesn’t always serve as the cure for               
nostalgia’s symptom of homesickness. Within the next several decades, the generation of ​Juifs             
d’Algérie ​would eventually move on from their homeland to the construction of an intangible              
other. I am honored to have paid tribute to and to have documented several of these experiences,                 
against the foil of different contemporary opinions and theoretical approaches to this part of the               
modern history of Algeria, France, and Israel. Having moved from ​the ​homeland and constructed              
several others, the collective identities, perceptions of homeland, and displacements I have            
discussed have both enlightened and inspired many more questions à propos nationalism,            
religion, colonialism, and decolonization that, alas, fall beyond the scope of the present project.              
But I hope, and trust, I will have the occasion to investigate at least some of them more fully and                    
properly in the not too distant future.  
 
130 Ibid. 
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